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THE DESEGREGATION OF CHILDREN WITH
DISABILITIES*

We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal.'
Inclusion is a right, not a privilege for a select few.'
The perception that a segregated institution is academically superiorfor a
[disabled] child may reflect no more than a basic disagreement with the
mainstreaming concept.'

Table of Contents
I.

II.

................................

600

BACKGROUND .................................

603
603
604

INTRODUCTION

A.
B.
C.

A History of De Jure Exclusion .............
Early Legislative Reforms ..................
Constitutional Theories of Educational
Opportunities for Children With Disabilities...
1. A Constitutional Right to Education ......

606
606

* I wish to thank the following individuals who in a variety of ways contributed to this
Comment: Linda D'Costanzo, Noelle Brennan, Mark Weber, Karen O'Neill, Terese McKee
Hopfensperger, Brian Sweeney, Galen Buckwalters, and the good people at the Illinois Planning
Council on Developmental Disabilities, Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, Inc.,
Berkeley, Ca, and the Public Interest Law Center of Philidelphia. I owe a special debt of
gratitude to my parents, Dr. & Mrs. Billy Melvin, and my in-laws, Keith & Crystal Litavsky, who
gave me and my family so much support during the course of this project. Finally, whatever
contribution this Comment makes to the discourse on the legal rights of the disabled, I dedicate it
to my children, Ali, Kacki, Dylan and Phoenix, and my wife, Theresa Litavsky, who more than
anyone has taught me the meaning of human rights.
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
2. Oberti v. Board of Educ., 801 F. Supp. 1392, 1404 (D.N.J. 1992).
3. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). "Mainstreaming" is the term commonly used to denote the integration of children with disabilities in the regular classroom. See Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 878 n.6 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (noting
that "mainstreaming" is technically distinguishable from "inclusion" by the fact that children
whose primary placement is a special education class may be "mainstreamed" in the regular education classroom for parts of the day, while under "inclusion" a child's primary placement is the
regular education classroom), affid sub nom. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14
F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). For purposes of this Comment, "mainstreaming" and "inclusion" will
be used interchangeably to denote the integration of disabled children into the regular education
classroom.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1975, Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (now part of the Individuals with Disabilities Educa-
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tion Act)" ("IDEA" or "Act"). The Act held out hope for parents
of children with disabilities that their children would not be denied
a "free
appropriate public education" on the basis of their disability.5 For other parents, however, whose children were already being
educated in segregated special education classes, the Act held out a
different hope - the hope that their children would now be given an
opportunity to be educated along side their non-disabled peers.' The
provision in the IDEA that ignited this hope obligates the states to
"assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are educated with children who are not disabled," and
that children are not removed from the regular classroom unless
they cannot be satisfactorily educated there with the use of "supplementary aids and services." 7 Notwithstanding this expression of
Congressional preference for educating children with disabilities
with non-disabled children, only about one-third of the approximately five million disabled children receiving a special education in
the 1990-91 school year were educated entirely in the regular education classroom. 8 Few children with severe intellectual disabilities
are educated in the regular classroom. For example, only 7.4% of
the mentally retarded children were educated in the regular classroom in the 1990-91 school year.9
The question of whether all children with disabilities should be
educated in the regular classroom has become a topic of intense national debate involving educators, parents, and advocates for the disabled. 10 In the meantime, parents and school boards continue to go
4. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (amending the Education of the Handicapped Act
(EHA)) (codified with subsequent amendments at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
6. Id. § 1412(5)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
7. Id. Popularly termed the "mainstreaming mandate" or "least restrictive environment" provision, this Comment draws no distinction between the two terms.
8. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 16 (1993) [hereinafter DOE 15TH ANNUAL
REPORT]. In Illinois, only 3.2 percent of all categories of children with disabilities were fully
included in the regular classroom for the 1990-91 school year. ILLINOIS PLANNING COUNCIL ON
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES & ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, THE IDENTIFICATION OF
FINANCIAL DISINCENTIVES TO EDUCATING CHILDREN AND YOUTH WITH MODERATE TO SEVERE

AND MULTIPLE DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES IN THEIR HOME SCHOOLS 47-48 (1993) [hereinafter FINANCIAL DISINCENTIVES]. Of those children that were fully included, 97% had physical

rather than cognitive impairments. Id. at 49.
9. DOE 15TH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 21 (Table 1.6).
10. Compare NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BOARDS OF EDUCATION, WINNERS ALL: A
CALL FOR INCLUSIVE SCHOOLS 4 (1992) (calling for state and local school boards to make a
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to court to resolve disputes over what the IDEA's mainstreaming
mandate requires.11 Recently, two federal courts issued decisions
that have garnered national attention. 2 In Oberti v. Board of Education,"3 the Third Circuit affirmed a district court decision holding
that the school district had not proven that a six-year-old boy with
Down's Syndrome - a genetic defect seriously impairing the child's
intellectual functioning and ability to communicate - could not be
educated in the regular classroom with supplementary aids and services."' In Sacramento City Unified School District v. Rachel H.,11
the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court decision holding that a
moderately retarded eleven-year-old girl should be educated in the
regular classroom with supplemental services. 6 These decisions only
"fundamental shift in the delivery of education" from a dual to a unified system of education for
all children) and James McCleskey & Debra Pacchiano, Mainstreaming Students with Learning
Disabilities: Are We Making Progress?, 60 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 508, 515-16 (1994) (noting
that the segregated education of the learning disabled has been ineffective at best, and that a
major initiative to educate students with mild disabilities in nonrestrictive settings is long overdue)
and Margaret C. Wang, et al., Reform All Categorical Programs, EDUC. WEEK, Mar. 24, 1993,
at 64 (advocating abolishing programs based on categories of disabilities, especially "mild" disabilities, in favor of programs that restructure the regular education classroom to improve the educational performance of all students) with Douglas Fuchs & Lynn S. Fuchs, Inclusive School
Movement and the Radicalization of Special Education Reform, 60 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN
294, 295 (1994) (criticizing the "inclusive schools" movement as insular and unlikely to forge a
"productive alliance with general education") and Sara Sklaroff, A.F.T. Urges Halt to "Full Inclusion" Movement, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 12, 1994, at 7 (reporting on the American Federation of
Teachers' call for a moratorium on inclusion of all children with disabilities in the regular classroom until policies are developed to deal with problems cited by member teachers). The current
debate grew out of a seminal article adapted from a speech by Madeleine C. Will, then Assistant
Secretary for the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, U.S. Department of
Education, pointing out the limitations of educating children with learning disabilities in separate
"special" programs and the need for a greater contribution by regular education programs in
carrying out the individualized education plans of children with such needs. Madeleine C. Will,
Educating Children with Learning Problems: A Shared Responsibility, 52 EXCEPTIONAL CHIL-

411 (1986).
11. See MARK C.

DREN

WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE §§ 9.1-9.3, at
9:1-9:18 (1992 & Supp. 1994) (surveying the case law concerned with the mainstreaming provision of the IDEA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
12. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'g sub
nom. Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Cal. 1992); Oberti v. Board of Educ.,
995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Debra Viadero, Disabled N.J. Boy Must Be Placed in
Regular Classroom, Court Rules, EDUC. WEEK, June 9, 1993, at 12 (noting the national attention
that Oberti attracted after the federal trial judge announced that "[ijnclusion is a right, not a
privilege for the select few").
13. 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993).
14. Id.
15. 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'g sub nom. Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874
(E.D. Cal. 1992).
16. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1405.
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sharpen the conflict in the federal appellate courts over precisely
what is the substantive standard for mainstreaming children with
disabilities.1"
This Comment aims to illuminate the contours of that conflict
and to advance an interpretation of the mainstreaming provision
that is consistent with other key provisions of the IDEA and the
Americans with Disabilities Act. 8 Next, the broad implications of
such an interpretation are discussed, underscoring the important
role of independent judicial review of educational placement
decisions. 9
II. BACKGROUND

A.

A History of De Jure Exclusion

The history of educating children with disabilities in the United
States is a tale of neglect and exclusion.2 0 One study found that as
late as 1969, only seven states were educating more than fifty-one
percent of their disabled children." Until recently, exclusion of children with disabilities from public schools enjoyed the imprimatur of
state courts and legislatures. 2 In 1893, the highest court of Massachusetts upheld the expulsion from the public schools of a child who
was "weak in mind." 23 In 1919, the Wisconsin Supreme Court approved the exclusion of a child who was capable of benefiting from a
public school education, but had a speech impediment and displayed
facial contortions and uncontrollable drooling. 4
17. See infra notes 182-340 and accompanying text (discussing the mainstreaming mandate
and the courts' responses to that mandate). The Supreme Court has never heard a case that
clearly presented the question of what the "mainstreaming" mandate requires.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (West Supp. 1994); see infra notes 105-81 and accompanying text (discussing in depth the IDEA and Americans with Disabilities Act provision).
19. See infra notes 502-13 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of desegregating children with disabilities).
20. See generally HR. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975) (detailing the need for
support for the education of handicapped children); Jeffrey J. Zettel & Joseph Ballard, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-142): Its History, Origins, and Concepts, in SPECIAL

EDUCATION IN AMERICA: ITS LEGAL AND GOVERNMENTAL FOUNDATIONS

11, 12

(Joseph Ballard et al. eds., 1982) (describing how handicapped children have been particularly
susceptible to educational exclusion).
21. Zettel & Ballard, supra note 20, at 12.
22. WEBER. supra note 11, § 1.1 at 1:1. For examples of state legislation permitting exclusion
of exceptional children, see Richard Handel, The Role of the Advocate in Securing the Handicapped Child's Right to an Effective Minimal Education, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 351-52 (1974).
23. Watson v. City of Cambridge, 32 N.E. 864, 865 (Mass. 1893).
24. Beattie v. Board of Educ., 172 N.W. 153, 155 (Wis. 1919).
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As late as 1958, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the state
compulsory education statute did not require the state to provide a
free public education to children with mental impairments;2 5 and in
1965, a North Carolina statute made it a crime for parents to "persist[] in forcing . . . [the] attendance" of a child with disabilities
who school authorities had determined could not "profit from
instruction. '"26
B.

Early Legislative Reforms

Early legislative reforms in the education of children with disabilities began with the establishment of state and city schools for the
deaf and blind in the nineteenth century. 7 The state of Kentucky
established the first state school for the deaf in 1823, and other
states followed. 28 The first public day school for deaf children was
established in Boston in 1869, and by 1900, various large cities had
created public school programs for disabled children. 9 The federal
government contributed in 1864 when Abraham Lincoln signed a
bill creating Gallaudet College, a college for the deaf. 0
Significant developments occurred in the first quarter of this century as New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts passed the first
mandatory special education programs. 1 Minnesota created special
education certification requirements in 1915, and in 1919, Pennsylvania provided for cooperative agreements between school districts
for the delivery of special education. 2 Oregon began funding classes
for "'educationally exceptional children'" in 1923.11
The federal government's first significant commitment to special
education occurred in 1958 with the appropriation of funds for the
25. Department of Pub. Welfare v. Haas, 154 N.E.2d 265, 270 (I11.
1958).
26. 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ch. 584, amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-65 (1963).
27. See Frederick J. Weintraub & Joseph Ballard, Introduction: Bridging the Decades to SPECIAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA: ITS LEGAL AND GOVERNMENTAL FOUNDATIONS 1, 1-2 (Joseph Ballard et al. eds., 1982) (noting that public support of the private education of handicapped children
began in 1852 when Pennsylvania appropriated funds to educate mentally retarded children in a
private school).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. The federal government first got involved in special education in 1827 when it sold land
to Kentucky for use by the state school for the deaf. WEBER, supra note 11,§ 1.1 at 1:2 n.9.
31. H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975).
32. Weintraub & Ballard, supra note 27, at 2.
33. Id. Oregon's program for "educationally exceptional children" included classes for "gifted"
children. Id.
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training of teachers of the mentally retarded. 4 That same year,
Congress also enacted the National Defense Education Act of 1958
which provided the first substantial federal subsidies to public
schools.35
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 19656
("ESEA") provided funds to improve educational opportunities for
disadvantaged children including children with disabilities. One year
later, the ESEA was amended to add Title VI, establishing grants
for the education of children with disabilities. 7 These federal efforts
were expanded in 1970 when Congress passed the Education of the
Handicapped Act ("EHA").36 In the years immediately following
the passage of the EHA, federal subsidies for special education increased substantially.39
Thus, by the early 1970s, school districts were providing more
and more disabled children with a free, public education. However,
the disparity between educational opportunities for children with
disabilities and non-disabled children remained conspicuous and systemic.40 Drawing on the landmark Supreme Court decision in
Brown v. Board of Education,1 parents and advocates went to court
in unprecedented numbers in the early 1970s, claiming that an
equal educational opportunity for disabled children was guaranteed
by the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth
34. Expansion of Teaching in the Education of Mentally Retarded Children Act of 1958, Pub.
L. No. 85-926, 72 Stat. 1777 (1958). This Act was later expanded to include other disabilities.
Weintraub & Ballard, supra note 27, at 2.
35. Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580 (1958). The Act was categorical, focusing on "specific
national needs and populations." One of its primary purposes was to advance "the education of
gifted and talented children." Weintraub & Ballard, supra note 27, at 2.
36. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) amended by Title VI, Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 161, 80
Stat. 1204 (1966).
37. Id.
38. Education of the Handicapped Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-230, §§ 601-62, 84 Stat. 175,
175-88, amended by Title VI, Pub. L. No. 93-380, §§ 611-21, 88 Stat. 579, 579-85 (1974),
amended by Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified with subsequent amendments at 20
U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
39. WEBER, supra note 11, § 1.3(1) at 1:4 (citing Donald W. Keim, Note, The Education of
All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 110, 119 (1976)). A number of
state legislative reforms were also enacted in the early 1970s. See H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 10 (1975); Merle McClung, Do Handicapped Children Have a Legal Right to a Minimally Adequate Education?, 3 J.L. & EDUC. 153, 167-71 (1974) (discussing state constitutions,
statutes, and regulations which explicitly provide or imply a right to an adequate or minimally
adequate education).
40. See H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1975) (finding that "over 50 percent of
the [disabled] children in this Nation . . . are denied a fundamental educational opportunity").
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Amendment."
C. Constitutional Theories of Educational Opportunitiesfor
Children with Disabilities
1. A Constitutional Right to Education
Constitutional theories of equal educational opportunity for children with disabilities are rooted in the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education.4 3 The Court's decision in Brown rested on several findings. First, the Court noted the
importance of education to a democratic society"" and to a child's
ability to succeed in life." Consequently, the Court held that an
educational opportunity is so important that "where the state has
undertaken to provide it, [it] is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. 46 Secondly, the Court found that segregating school children on the basis of race engendered feelings of
inferiority 47 and that such de jure segregation had "a tendency to
[retard] the educational and mental development of negro children."48 Thus, the Court ruled that "separate but equal" educational facilities for black students was inherently unequal, depriving
black children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 9
42. WEBER, supra note 11, § 1.2 at 1:3 (citing Alan Abeson, Movement and Momentum: Government and the Education of Handicapped Children-lI, 41 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 109, 113
(1974)).
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Brown decision was foreshadowed by the Supreme Court's decisions in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (holding that a black law school was not in
fact equal and citing not only the tangible but the intangible inequalities between the two schools)
and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950) (finding that physical segregation of a black student within a previously all-white university prevented the student from receiving an equal educational opportunity because the segregation "[impaired] and [inhibited] his
ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general,
to learn his profession").
44. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 ("[Education] is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship.").
45. Id. ("Today, [education] is a principle instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment.").
46. Id.
47. Id. at 494.
48. Id. (citation omitted).
49. Id. at 495. For a concise discussion of the rationales for the Court's holding in Brown, see
GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 499-504 (2d ed. 1991); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1474-80 (2d ed. 1988).
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While Brown v. Board of Education addressed the equal protection concerns raised by the segregation of black children, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,"°
("P.A.R.C.") is one early case to consider the implications of the
Fourteenth Amendment for the disparate treatment of children with
disabilities. 1 In that case, a three-judge federal district court panel
held that the plaintiff class of mentally retarded children had made
out a colorable constitutional claim on both equal protection and
due process grounds.52
Crediting expert testimony that mentally retarded children can
benefit from education and training, the court decided that there
was no rational basis for the school districts' complete denial of an
educational opportunity to mentally retarded children." Thus, the
court held that the disparate treatment the plaintiffs were accorded
presented a colorable equal protection claim.54 The panel also found
that the danger of misdiagnosis or placement in overly restrictive
environments, and the attendant stigmatization, implicated a child's
"liberty" interest which cannot be infringed without due process.55
Since the school districts did not provide aggrieved parents with a
hearing, the court held that the plaintiffs had made out a colorable
due process claim." P.A.R.C. resulted in a consent decree whereby
mentally retarded children were guaranteed "access to a free public
program of education and training appropriate to [the] capacities"
of each child.57 Further, the school districts were obligated to presume that "placement in a regular public school class is preferable
to placement in a special public school class and placement in a
special public school class is preferable to placement in any other
type of program."58
50. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), later proceeding. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
51. P.A.R.C. resulted in a consent decree to which only one school district objected. 334 F.
Supp. at 1258. Thus, the court's second proceeding was confined to the narrow issue of whether
the plaintiffs presented a colorable or plausible constitutional claim sufficient to support the
court's jurisdiction to approve the decree. P.A.R.C., 343 F. Supp. at 279.
52. id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 297.

55. Id. at 293-95.
56. Id. at 295.
57. Id. at 314.
58. Id. at 307. The consent decree also entitled the parents of mentally retarded children, or
children thought to be mentally retarded, to notice and an opportunity for a hearing before any
change in the child's educational status. Id. at 303. Also, reevaluation was required every two
years and the child's parents could request reevaluation annually. Id. at 314.
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Mills v. Board of Education59 is another early case where a district court addressed a constitutional challenge to the exclusion of
children with disabilities from public schools. Applying the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, ° the court found that
complete denial of an educational opportunity to children with disabilities or exclusion from a special education program without a
prior hearing violated the children's constitutional rights.61 Further,
the cost of educating disabled children was not a sufficient cause for
exclusion.62 The burden of the school district's inadequacies could
not be permitted to fall heavier on children with disabilities than on
children without disabilities.6 3
P.A.R.C. and Mills are but two cases from the 1970s64 that found
a constitutional right to educational opportunity for disabled children.6" However, not all courts that addressed the issue during that
time period found such a constitutional right. 66 Further, the United
59. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
60. Id. at 868. Seven children that had been labeled as either behavior problems, mentally
retarded, emotionally disturbed or hyperactive brought suit against the Board of Education of the
District of Columbia claiming that they had been wrongfully denied admission or excluded after
admission to the public schools. Id. Certified as a class action, the plaintiffs brought statutory,
regulatory and constitutional claims, only the last of which is discussed here. Id. at 868, 873-74.
61. Id. at 875. Since the District of Columbia is not a state, the court's equal protection analysis is premised on prior decisions holding that denial of an equal educational opportunity violates
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. (citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954) and Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967)).
62. Id. at 876.
63. Id.
64. In 1975, Congress noted "[s]ince P.A.R.C. and Mills there have been 46 ['right to education'] cases which are completed or still pending in 28 States." H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1975).
65. See, e.g., Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding that
segregating emotionally disturbed students in special day schools violated the equal protection
clause), vacated, 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980); Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832, 836
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (concluding that the disabled are a "quasi-suspect class"); Fialkowski v. Shapp,
405 F. Supp. 946, 957-59 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (denying the defendant's motion to dismiss and rejecting defendant's argument that there is no fundamental right to education); In re G.H., 218
N.W.2d 441, 445-47 (N.D. 1974) (finding that the right to education is a constitutional right
under the North Dakota Constitution) (citing Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.
1972)). For an example of a school desegregation case which supports the holding that state and
federal constitutions prohibit deprivation of "meaningful educational opportunities" to disabled
children when the state offers education to non-disabled children, see Panitch v. Wisconsin, 444 F.
Supp. 320, 322-23 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (ordering the school district to offer an "appropriate" public
education where the state law guaranteed public education to all children ages 4 to 20).
66. See, e.g., Cuyahoga County Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Essex, 411 F. Supp. 46, 50-53
(N.D. Ohio 1976) (upholding a statutory system denying a public education to "trainable mentally retarded" children under a "rational basis" test, finding the distinction between "educable"
and "trainable" mentally retarded children to have a reasonable relationship to the governmental
purpose of allocating finite public resources); cf. Doe v. Laconia Supervisory Union No. 30, 396 F.
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States Supreme Court's 1973 decision in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez6 7 cast doubt on the notion that disabled children
had a constitutional right to a particular level of educational benefit. 68 In that case, the Court upheld a school financing system where
schools were funded primarily with local property taxes, even
though it resulted in disparities in the amount of funding from district to district. 9 The Court rejected an equal protection argument,
concluding that education is not a fundamental right triggering the
"strict scrutiny" test.7 0 However, the Court warned that it was not
passing on the constitutionality of an "absolute denial of educational
opportunit[y] ' ' 71 and expressly assumed that all children in the state
were receiving an opportunity to acquire basic skills.72 Thus, Rodriguez did not foreclose equal protection claims by disabled children
78
receiving no education or an inadequate education.
More recent Supreme Court opinions have plainly held that education is not a "fundamental right" triggering "heightened" or
"strict scrutiny" in the absence of a suspect or semi-suspect classification. 4 And, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center75 , the
Supp. 1291, 1296-98 (D.N.H. 1975) (rejecting claim that disparate funding for emotionally disturbed amounted to an equal protection violation under a "rational basis" test, crediting state's
argument that emotionally disturbed students were less severely disabled than the deaf, blind,
mentally retarded, or multiply handicapped).
67. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 33-36. For purposes of equal protection analysis, the Supreme Court has authorized
three tests-"rational basis," "strict scrutiny," and "intermediate or heightened scrutiny." Normally, the Court applies the rational basis test; the state's classifications are only required to have
"some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)
(5-4 decision). The "strict scrutiny" test requires the state to demonstrate that the classification
employed is "precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest." Id. at 217. The strict
scrutiny test is applied to discrimination claims involving either a "fundamental right" or "suspect
classifications." Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977). "Fundamental rights" include the right
to vote, the right to interstate travel, and the right to access to the judicial process. TRINE, supra
note 49, at 1454-65. The archetypal "suspect classification" is one based on race. Id. at 1465. Sex,
national origin, alienage, and illegitimacy have, with exceptions, triggered "heightened" or "intermediate" scrutiny. Id. at 1610. "Intermediate scrutiny" requires that the asserted classification
serve "important governmental objectives and be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to genderbased classifications).
71. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. at 37.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457-62 (1988) (upholding a fee for
transporting students between home and school on the grounds that wealth is not a "suspect classification" and the right to attend school does not trigger strict or heightened scrutiny in the
absence of a suspect or semi-suspect class); Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328 n.7 (1983)
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United States Supreme Court held that the mentally retarded are
not a suspect or semi-suspect class. 6 However, Congress recently
found that "individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular
minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to
a position of political powerlessness in our society."" Thus, while
the United States Supreme Court has not found the Fourteenth
Amendment to accord special protection to individuals with disabilities, Congress has invoked "the sweep of congressional authority,
including the powers to enforce the fourteenth amendment . . . to
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities. 7 8
2. A Constitutional Right to Education in the Least Restrictive
Environment
Children with disabilities have been segregated from children
without disabilities not only by their exclusion from the public
schools, but by their placement in separate schools and classrooms. 9
The United States Supreme Court held in Brown v. Board of Education8" that a segregated education for black school children was
an "inherently unequal" education due to the possibly irreparable
injury to a child's motivation caused by the feelings of inferiority
engendered by segregation."1 No court has ruled on whether the segregation of children with disabilities in separate schools or classrooms is "inherently unequal" because of the stigma that attaches
from exclusion from the regular educational program. However, the
(stating that education is not a "fundamental right" and that a bona fide residence requirement
did not implicate a "suspect classification"). But see Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218-24 (applying heightened scrutiny to a statute denying school enrollment to children of illegal aliens on the grounds
that such children are akin to a "semi-suspect class" and total exclusion from school would have
severe personal and social consequences). For a review of recent Supreme Court cases addressing
the "right to education" issue, see generally GERALD M. ZELIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW (IDELR Special Rep. No. 8) 13 (1993).
75. 473 U.S. 432 (1984).
76. Id. at 446. Cleburne involved a zoning ordinance prohibiting the construction of a group
home for mentally retarded adults in a residential neighborhood. Id. at 435. Applying a "rational
basis" test, the Supreme Court overturned the ordinance. Id. at 450.
77. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (Supp. V 1993).
78. Id. § 12101(b)(4) (emphasis added).
79. See infra notes 214-332 (discussing cases where disabled children have challenged placements in segregated environments).
80. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
81. Id. at 495.
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consent agreement approved by the court in P.A.R.C. obligated the
state to adopt a policy of preferring placement in a regular classroom over placement in a special education classroom; and placement in a special education classroom over placement in another
institution.82
One commentator concludes that the early judicial remedy of preferring that children with disabilities be educated with their nondisabled peers is an application of the principle that when legitimate
state interests conflict with the constitutional rights of individuals,
the state must adopt the "least restrictive alternative" to attaining
its objective.83 A segregated education, it is argued, implicates the
disabled child's First Amendment right of association with non-disabled children, 4 and the child's liberty interest in reputation (avoidance of stigma).8 5
The countervailing state objective, however, is the goal of providing disabled children with an education "appropriate to [their] capacity." 86 Providing an "appropriate" education is presumed to require an alternative placement where the child's educational needs
cannot be satisfactorily met in the regular classroom. 8 Thus, the
"least restrictive alternative" principle serves to protect the rights of
disabled children by requiring the state to achieve its educational
objectives in a fashion that places the "least restrictions" on the ex82. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children ("P.A.R.C.") v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279,
307 (E.D. Pa. 1972).

83. H. RUTHERFORD TURNBULL III, FREE APPROPRIATE EDUCATION: THE LAW AND CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 146 (1990). For a discussion of the development of "least restrictive
alternative" as a principle of law, see TASK FORCE ON LEAST RESTRICTION. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 21-36 (H. Rutherford Turnbull, ed. 1981).
84.

TURNBULL. SUPRA

note 83, at 148; see also Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles

of Constitutional Law. 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959) (recasting the issue of state-enforced segre-

gation as one involving the freedom to associate).
85. See P.A.R.C., 343 F. Supp. at 293-95 (discussing the stigma that attaches to the labeling of
children as mentally retarded); cf. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1957) ("Segregation in
public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children [a] burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty.")
(emphasis added). Professor Turnbull suggests that equal protection concerns are also implicated
since the separate educational programs for children with disabilities, not unlike the separate education programs for black children, were generally unequal to that provided for non-disabled chil-

dren.

TURNBULL,

supra note 83, at 150.

86. P.A.R.C., 343 F. Supp. at 307.
87. TURNBULL, supra note 83, at 163; see P.A.R.C., 343 F. Supp. at 297 (noting that plaintiffs
did not object to separate special education classes or the "proper assignment" of retarded children to special classes).

DEPA UL LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 44:599

ercise of fundamental rights.88
The United States Supreme Court has never ruled that the segregated education of children with disabilities implicates a child's
right of association or that the stigma of segregation violates the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of equal protection and due process. Nor has the Supreme Court ever held that the Constitution
requires states to educate children with disabilities in the "least restrictive" setting. Nevertheless, the notion that children with disabilities have a right to be educated in the "least restrictive" setting has
been codified in three federal statutes.
D. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 - Congress Recognizes the
Civil Rights of the Disabled
Passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the first significant
legislation by Congress to address discrimination against the disabled.8 9 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act bars discrimination
against persons with disabilities in connection with all federally assisted activity.90 Since children in need of special education are
88. TURNBULL, supra note 83, at 148. For an instructive discussion of the "least restrictive
alternative" principle in a related area, see David L. Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill Practical Guidelines and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV.
1108, 1145-54 (1972). See generally TASK FORCE ON LEAST RESTRICTION, supra note 83 (discussing the "least restrictive alternative" principle as it relates to treatment of the mentally
retarded).
89. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). Most of the published legislative history on the 1973 Rehabilitation Act focuses on the grant-in-aid parts of the Act. However, the Senate Committee handling
the bill underscored its concern with removing existing barriers to handicapped individuals in
employment, housing and transportation. WEBER, supra, note 11, § 1.3(3) at 1:14 (citing S. REP.
No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076, 2078). Explaining
the bill that would later become Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, Senator Humphrey
remarked:
The time has come when we can no longer tolerate the invisibility of the handicapped
in America. I am talking about over I million American children who are excluded
from school . . . [T]oo often we keep children whom we regard as "different" or a
"disturbing influence," out of our schools and community activities altogether, rather
than help them develop their abilities . . .
118 CONG. REC. 525 (1972). Since 1978, all the remedies, procedural protections and rights secured under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act are available under Section 504. 29 U.S.C.
§ 794a(a)(2) (1988). Attorneys' fees are also available, id. § 794a(b), and in 1986, Congress
abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity for actions brought under Section 504. Civil
Rights Remedies Equalization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988) (overruling Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)).
90. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-112, Title V § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Section 504 provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States . . . shall,

1995]

CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES

613

deemed to have disabilities under Section 504, and public education
is a federally assisted activity, Section 504 protects children with
disabilities from discrimination in the provision of education.9 1
A fundamental issue in the implementation of Section 504 is
whether the statute bars only intentional discrimination, or whether
it also requires accommodation to those disparately impacted by
program characteristics.9" The United States Supreme Court clarified its position in Alexander v. Choate,93 stating that Section 504
does not require "fundamental" or "substantial" modifications to
accommodate "otherwise qualified" disabled persons."" However,
"reasonable accommodations" necessary for meaningful access is
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by
any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Supp. V 1993) (as amended in 1992).
Program or activity includes the entire institution receiving financial assistance for any of its programs or activities. Id. § 794(b) (1988) (codifying in part the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987, Pub. L. 100-259, § 4, 102 Stat. 28, 29 (1988)). For a concise treatment of the § 504
provisions bearing on special education, see WEBER, supra note 11, §§ 1.3-1.4 at 1:11-1:16; Judith
Welch Wegner, Educational Rights of Handicapped Children: Three Federal Statutes and an
Evolving Jurisprudence Part I: The Statutory Maze, 17 J. L. & EDUC. 387, 395-404 (1988)
[hereinafter Statutory Maze]. For a comprehensive discussion of § 504, see Judith Welch Wegner, The Anti-Discrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 401
(1984) [hereinafter Wegner, Equal Opportunity]. For legislative history and helpful background,
see Martin H. Gerry & J. Martin Benton, Section 504: The Larger Umbrella, in SPECIAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA: IT'S LEGAL AND GOVERNMENTAL FOUNDATIONS

41 (1982); Statutory Maze,

supra at 396 n.36.
91. The Act defines "individuals with disabilities" as "any person who (i) has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities,
(ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29
U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (as amended in 1992). The language of § 504 tracks
that of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988) (prohibiting race and
national origin discrimination in federally financed activities) and Title IX of the Higher Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sex in federally assisted higher education). The statutes are interpreted similarly. WEBER, supra
note 11, § 1.3 at 1:13.
92. Wegner, Equal Opportunity, supra note 90, at 401; see, e.g., Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S.
992, 1018 (1984) (stating that § 504 "does not require affirmative action on behalf of handicapped persons, but only the absence of discrimination"); Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410-12 (1979) (distinguishing between the "even handed treatment of qualified [disabled] persons," which is required by § 504, and "affirmative action" which is not).
93. 469 U.S. 287, 306-309 (1985) (unanimous decision) (holding that state Medicaid policy of
limiting benefits for hospitalization stays to a 14-day maximum, though having a disparate impact
on the disabled, did not violate § 504 in view of the "meaningful access" currently enjoyed by the
disabled, and the burdens that expanded coverage for the disabled would impose on the state).
94. Id. at 300 n.20.
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required.9 6
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's views, the regulations issued pursuant to Section 504 for preschool, elementary, and secondary education require schools to make substantial accommodations
for disabled students.9 6 Specifically, the regulations require "that a
recipient of federal assistance that operates a public elementary or
secondary education program shall provide a free appropriatepublic
education to each qualified handicapped person who is in the recipient's jurisdiction, regardless of the nature or severity of the person's
handicap." 97 An appropriateeducation is defined by the regulations
as one that is "designed to meet individual educational needs of
[disabled] persons as adequately as the needs of [non-disabled]
persons are met."' 8
In addition, the regulations require that students with disabilities
be educated in the "least restrictive environment" 99 and that facilities for disabled students be comparable to those for non-disabled
students. 00 Students are insured non-discriminatory evaluation and
placement guarantees,"' procedural safeguards,1 0 2 and an equal opportunity to participate in non-academic and extracurricular activities, 03 preschool, and adult education programs.' 0 '
E. Educationfor All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.
The passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975 (now part of the IDEA) 05 heralded an unprecedented com95. Id.
96. 34 C.F.R. § 104.31-40 (1993).
97. Id. § 104.33 (emphasis added).
98. Id. § 104.33(b)(1)(i) (emphasis added).
99. The "least restrictive environment" is a concept that appears in regulations promulgated
under both § 504 and the IDEA. Compare id. § 104.34 (although it doesn't use the term "least
restrictive environment," this regulation titled "Educational setting" requires each recipient of
funds under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to mainstream each handicapped person "to
the maximum extent possible") with id. § 300.550-556 (falling under the heading "The Least
Restrictive Environment," these regulations discuss the mainstreaming mandate of the IDEA).
The term "least restrictive alternative" is often referred to as the "mainstreaming" mandate.
100. 34 C.F.R. § 104.34 (1993).
101. Id. § 104.35.
102. Id. § 104.36.
103. Id. § 104.37.
104. Id. § 104.38. Private elementary and secondary school operators receiving federal assistance are barred from excluding qualified disabled students who can receive an appropriate education with minor adjustments in the program. Id. § 104.39.
105. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (amending the Education of the Handicapped
Act (EHA)) (codified with subsequent amendments at 20 U.S.C. § 1400-85 (1988 & Supp. V
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mitment by Congress to address in a comprehensive way the inadequacies and inequities it perceived in the education of children with
disabilities. 10 6 Congress expressly found that the "special educational needs of . . .children [with disabilities] are not being fully
met;''1 0 7 and that "it is in the national interest that the Federal Government assist State and local efforts to provide programs to .. .
children with disabilities in order to assure equal protection of the
08
law."'
1.

The Legislative History of IDEA

The legislative history of the IDEA makes clear that the Act was
intended to address the equal protection and due process concerns
raised in the early "right to education" cases. 0 9 Quoting Brown v.
Board of Education, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare stated that the Supreme Court had established the principle that "all children be guaranteed equal educational opportu1993)).
106. See generally S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425; HR. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Even before the passage of
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Congress enacted an interim measure
intended to redress what it perceived to be the continuing inequities in the education of disabled
children. Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 79,
amending Education of the Handicapped Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-230, §§ 601-62, 84 Stat.
175; see HR. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1975) (explaining that the Education
Amendments of 1974 required states receiving federal special education funding to (a) set a goal
for providing educational opportunities to all children with disabilities, (b) provide procedural
safeguards for parents of children denied appropriate services; and (c) give assurances that children with disabilities would be educated in the least restrictive environment).
107. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(2) (1988).
108. Id. § 1400(b)(9) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added). The foregoing language was carefully
considered by the House-Senate Conference Committee, the House acceding to the Senate bill
statement that assuring "equal protection of the laws" was an objective of the Act. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, S. CONF. REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2829 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1480, 1482.
109. See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975) (stating that the Education Amendments of 1974 - which include requirements of "full educational opportunity," procedural protections, and placement in the "least restrictive environment" for all children with disabilities incorporated the principles of the right to education cases), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1432;
H.R.REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975) (stating that the IDEA was intended to effectuate the purposes of the 1974 amendments) discussed and quoted in Board of Educ. v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176, 194, n.18. For legislative history discussing the right of children with disabilities to
equal protection, see HR. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 10, 14 (1975); S. REP. No. 168,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6, 9, 22-23 reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1429-30, 1433, 1446-47; S.
CONF. REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 148183; 121 CONG. REC. 19,478-511, 23,701-10, 25,526-48 (1975). For a discussion of early "right to
education" cases, see supra notes 43-78 and accompanying text.
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nity." 110 The Committee's Report further stated that "Congress
must take a more active role under its responsibility for equal protection of the laws to guarantee that handicapped children are provided equal educational opportunity." ' 1 Moreover, the Senate Committee recognized the states' "primary responsibility" to uphold the
Constitution of the United States, rejecting the argument that state
compliance should hinge on the federal government's ability to cover
the full cost of educating all children with disabilities.'
The legislative history evinces Congress's view that desegregating
children with disabilities is a matter of constitutional dimension."'
The drafters of the Act were concerned about the threat to individual liberty posed by risks of mislabeling, placement in needlessly
restrictive environments, and the attendant stigma that would attach." ' These concerns were directly raised in P.A.R.C., a case that
established principles which to a "significant extent" guided the
drafters of the IDEA. 15 There, the court concluded that the risks of
mislabeling, placement in overly restrictive environments, and the
attendant stigmatization, implicated the "liberty" interest of mentally retarded children." 6 Thus, due process guarantees for parents
were made a part of the consent decree approved by the court," 7 as
well as a stated preference for educating children in the least restrictive environment." 8 Drawing on the principles articulated in
110. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975) ("[Educational] opportunity . . . is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms.") (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1430.
111. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1433.
112. A Senate Report stated: "The defendants are required by the Constitution of the United
States . . . to provide a publicly-supported education for these 'exceptional' children." S. REP. No.
168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1446-47 (quoting Mills
v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972)).
113. S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975) (stating that the Education Amendments
of 1974 - which include a "least restrictive environment" requirement - "incorporated the major principles of the right to education cases"), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1432; HR. REP.
No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975) (stating that the IDEA seeks to effectuate the purposes of
the Education Amendments of 1974).
114. Compare Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 194 (1981) (citing Pennsylvania Ass'n
for Retarded Children ("P.A.R.C.") v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) as a case
that established principles that guided the drafters of the Act) with P.A.R.C.. 343 F. Supp. at
293-95 (discussing the potential harm to children from mislabeling, overly restrictive placements,
and the attendant stigma).
115. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 194 n.17 (citing S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975),
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1431 and H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1975)).
116. P.A.R.C., 343 F. Supp. at 293-95.
117. Id. at 308.
118. Id. at 307.
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P.A.R.C., Congress viewed the "mainstreaming" mandate as a central component of the Act," 9 a crucial right of parents and children
meriting due process protection. 1 0 As the House Report issued by
the Committee on Education and Labor explains, the elaborate due
process procedures mandated by the Act are designed, inter alia, to
assure that every child with a disability is "in fact" afforded an education in the "least restrictive environment." '
Notably, members of Congress believed that educating disabled
children with non-disabled children would have as much effect on
children without disabilities as it would on children with disabilities. "22
' Senator Stafford, a sponsor of the Act, wrote of the disabled
child's "invisibility" - kept out of sight, and when seen by others,
seen not as an individual, but as a manifestation of a disabling condition.' 2 3 Once disabled children are mainstreamed, it was hoped,
other children would come to see the disabled children as having a
disability, not as a disability.' 24 Children would grow up realizing
that their peers with disabilities are "neither threatening nor
evil."' 25 This would have the salutary effect of advancing the integration of individuals with disabilities - children and adults - into
119. A Senate Conference Report stated:
while instruction may take place in such locations as classrooms, the child's home, or
hospitals and institutions, the delivery of such instruction must take place in a manner
consistent with the requirements of law which provide that to the maximum extent
appropriate handicapped children must be educated with children who are not handicapped, and that handicapped children should be placed in special classes, separate
schooling, or any other educational environment only when the nature or severity of
the handicap is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary
aids and supportive services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
S. CONF. REP. No. 455, 94th cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1483.
For further discussion in support of the mainstreaming concept in the IDEA, see 121 CoNG. REC.
19,484 (1975) (statement of Sen. Stafford); id. at 19,485 (statement of Sen. Williams); id. at
19,505 (statement of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 23,703 (statement of Rep. Brademas); id. at 25,539
(statement of Rep. Miller).
120. H.R. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975),
121. Id.
122. See Robert T. Stafford, Education for the Handicapped: A Senator's Perspective, 3 VT. L.
REV. 71, 72 (1978) (stating that the Act would terminate the "two-tiered invisibility" in the
school systems), discussed in Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the
Handicapped Act: A Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 349,
364 (1990).
123. Id.
124. Weber, supra note 122, at 364 (citing Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma
of Difference: Bilingual and Special Education, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROaS. 157, 168-69
(1985)).
125. Id.
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the "mainstream" of society. 12 6
The integration of individuals with disabilities into the mainstream of society was not only a constitutional concern to Congress
but an economic concern as well. 27 Congress viewed the prevalence
of dependency and unproductivity among the adult disabled population as a problem that begins in the schools.128 Artificial barriers to
the full participation of individuals with disabilities not only perpetuate the stigma and indignity of institutionalization and dependency, but impose substantial financial burdens on families and ultimately society as a whole.12 9 Consequently, Congress believed that
money spent on educating children with disabilities to be self-sufficient adult members of society would be more humane, and less expensive to society than maintaining such persons as welfare dependents or in institutions.130
2. Overview of the Act'

1

The concerns raised in the legislative history of the IDEA also
find expression in the Congressional statement of findings and purpose that begin the Act. 3

2

The findings include:

(1) "more than half of the children with disabilities in the United
States do not receive appropriate educational services which would
enable them to have full equality of opportunity;"'-a
(2) "one million of the children with disabilities in the United
States are excluded entirely from the public school system and will
126. Id.
127. See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975) (noting that "billions of dollars are
expended each year to maintain [disabled] persons in these subhuman conditions"), reprinted in
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1433.
128. Id. (noting that providing educational services to children with disabilities will "ensure
against persons needlessly being forced into institutional settings").
129. Id.
130. Id.; see also John Harrison, Comment, Self-Sufficiency Under the Education for All
HandicappedChildren Act: A Suggested Judicial Approach, 1981 DUKE L.J. 516, 521-28 (emphasizing Congress' perception that children with disabilities need to achieve self-sufficiency so as
not to become a burden to society or the child's family, and to avoid the indignity of institutionalization); cf Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (Supp. V 1993)
(stating "the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such
individuals").
131. For a more comprehensive overview of the IDEA, see generally WEBER, supra note 11;
Wegner, Statutory Maze, supra note 90.
132. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (b), (c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
133. Id. § 1400(b)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
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not go through the educational process with their peers;"' 13 4
(3) "because of the lack of adequate services within the public
school system, families are often forced to find services outside the
public school system, often at great distance from their residence
and at their own expense; ' 135
(4) "developments in the training of teachers and in diagnostic
and instructional procedures and methods have advanced to the
point that, given appropriate funding, State and local educational
agencies can and will provide effective special education and related
services ...."1136
The principle purposes of the Act are to assist and assure that
states and localities provide children with disabilities a "free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs," and "that the
rights of children with disabilities and their parents . . . are
protected. '37
The IDEA is a grant-in-aid statute which conditions receipt of
funds on meeting specified obligations.13 8 To qualify for funding, the
state must pursue a "zero-reject" policy that "assures all children
with disabilities the right to a free appropriate public education"."3 9
134. Id. § 1400(b)(4).
135. Id.§ 1400(b)(6) (1988).
136. Id. § 1400(b)(7) (Supp. V 1993).
137. Id. § 1400(c).
138. Id. § 1412 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The question whether the IDEA was enacted under
authority of the Fourteenth Amendment or the spending power, and the implications this would
have for interpreting the IDEA, is beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally ZEUN, supra
note 74, at 3-9.
139. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (Supp. V 1993). See also Timothy W. v. Rochester, N.H. Sch. Dist.,
875 F.2d 954, 972-73 (1st Cir. 1989) (concluding that the Act's pervasive and purposeful use of
the term "all handicapped children" means that even severely disabled children are entitled to an
education under the Act), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 983 (1989). The Act defines "children with
disabilities" as children:
(i) with mental retardation, hearing impairments including deafness, speech or language impairments, visual impairments including blindness, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, or other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and
(ii) who, by reason thereof, need special education and related services.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
"Special education" is defined as
specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique
needs of a child with a disability, including-(A) instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings; and
(B) instruction in physical education.
Id. § 1401(a)(16).
"Related services" means
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In addition, the state must submit a plan detailing the policies and
procedures the state will undertake to assure, among other things,
that all children with disabilities in need of special education are
identified and evaluated, 140 procedural safeguards mandated by the
Act will be observed, and testing and evaluation materials used will
not be racially or culturally discriminatory."
The Act also requires the State to establish
procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, children with
disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care
facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and that special
classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities
from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or
transportation, and such developmental, corrective and other supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work services, counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, and medical services, except that
such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be
required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of disabling conditions in children.
Id. § 1401(a)(17).
"Free appropriate public education" is defined in the Act as
special education and related services that-(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in
conformity with the individualized education program required under section
1414(a)(5) of this title.
Id. § 1401(a)(18) (1988).
The term "individualized education program" is defined as:
a written statement for each child with a disability developed in any meeting by a
representative of the local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit who
shall be qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of children with disabilities, the teacher, the parents or
guardian of such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child, which statement shall
include -(A) a statement of the present levels of educational. performance of such
child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional objectives,
(C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to such child, and
the extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular educational programs, (D) a statement of the needed transition services for students beginning no
later than age 16 and annually thereafter (and, when determined appropriate for the
individual, beginning at age 14 or younger), including, when appropriate, a statement
of the interagency responsibilities [sic] or linkages (or both) before the student leaves
the school setting, (E) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of
such services, and (F) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and
schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved.
Id. § 1401(a)(20) (Supp. V 1993).
140. Id. § 1412(2)(C).
141. Id. § 1412(5).
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severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the
use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.14 2

This provision is popularly known as the "mainstreaming" mandate
or "least restrictive environment (LRE) requirement."" 3 In addition, the Act contains provisions that assure instructional and support personnel for education in the least restrictive environment.
The IDEA requires that "consistent with the purposes" of the Act,
states develop and implement a comprehensive plan for personnel
development which includes "the continuing education of regular
and special education [teachers]. '""4
The Act imposes requirements on the local education agency of
the state ("LEA") as well." 5 The LEA must submit an application
to the state educational agency ("SEA") providing, inter alia, assurances that funds will be used for the excess costs of a program
that is in compliance with the mainstreaming provisions of the
Act." Another specific requirement for the LEA is that consistent
with the mainstreaming requirements of the Act, the agency agrees
to provide "special services to enable children [with disabilities] to
participate in regular educational programs."" 7
The IDEA's goals of providing children with disabilities a free,
appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment are
achieved in part through provisions insuring the meaningful involvement of parents or guardians."" First, the IDEA includes parents or
guardians in the process whereby an "individualized educational
program" ("IEP") is developed for the child." 9 The local educational agency is then required to educate the child in conformity
142. Id.

§

1412(5)(B).

143. See Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1989) (referring to
section 1412(5)(B) as the "mainstreaming requirement"); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.550-556 (1992) (organizing implementing regulations under the heading "Least Restrictive Environment").
144. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(3)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1994) (emphasis added). The Senate Report
expressly identifies inservice training of regular as well as special education teachers as a necessary prerequisite to achieving "integration of handicapped children into the classroom" and the
"goal of least restrictive environment for handicapped children." S. REP.No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 33 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1457.
145. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
146. Id.§ 1414(a)(1).
147. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(iv) (1988).
148. Id. § 1415(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (establishing procedural safeguards for handicapped children who are provided free public education).
149. Id. § 1401(a)(20) (Supp. V 1993). For the statutory definition of "individualized educational program," see supra note 139.
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with the child's IEP.150
Secondly, parents and guardians are accorded specific procedural
rights. These rights include (1) prior written notice whenever an
agency "proposes to initiate or change, or refuses to initiate or
change, the identification, evaluation, special education placement
of the child; 15 1 (2) an opportunity to present complaints with respect to the identification, evaluation, placement, or provision of a
"free appropriate public education" to such child;152 and (3) subsequent to the filing of a complaint, an opportunity for "an impartial
due process hearing" to be conducted by a hearing officer not employed by the agency involved in the education of the child. 153
Any party aggrieved by the outcome of the administrative process
has the right to bring suit in either state or federal court without
regard to the amount in controversy.154 In such actions, the court is
to receive the records of the administrative proceedings, hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and "basing its decision on
the preponderance of the evidence," grant appropriate relief.1 55
Also, once administrative relief under the IDEA has been exhausted, parents and guardians are free to seek similar or additional
relief available to children with disabilities under other federal statutes such as Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.156
150. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18)(D) (1988).
151. Id. § 1415(b)(l)(C).
152. Id. § 1415(b)(l)(E).
153. Id. § 1415(b)(2). The due process hearing may be a one-tier or two-tier process depending
on state law or agency regulation. Id. If a two-tier process is used, then any party aggrieved by the
decision of the local hearing officer may appeal the decision to the state educational agency who is
bound to conduct an "impartial review" of the decision and "make an independent decision." Id.

§ 1415(c).
154. Id. § 1415(e)(2). During the pendency of any proceedings under the Act, a "stay-put"
provision requires that the child remain in the then current placement for the child, unless the
parent or guardian agrees otherwise. Id. § 1415(e)(3). Parents or guardians who prevail in suits
under the IDEA are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees. Id. § 1415(e)(4)(B)-(G).
The 1990 amendments to the IDEA prospectively abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity for
actions brought under the Act. Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 604(a), 104 Stat. 1103, 1106 (1990)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1403 (Supp. V 1993)).
155. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(1988). As was stated in the Joint Explanatory Statement of the
Committee of Conference, the IDEA was intended to "clarif[y] and strengthen[]" existing law
relating to judicial action, assuring inter alia that the court "shall make an independent decision
based on the preponderance of the evidence." S. CONF. REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50
(1975), reprinted in,1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1480, 1503 (emphasis added).
156. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(0 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (overruling Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S.
992 (1984) which held that the IDEA is the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs challenging state
action falling within the purview of the Act). For a discussion of the causes of action for children
with disabilities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, see
Wegner, Statutory Maze, supra note 90, at 387 and Judith Welch Wegner, Part 11:Future
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Least Restrictive Environment Regulations

The mainstreaming mandate of the IDEA has been the subject of
Department of Education regulations which fall under the heading
of "The Least Restrictive Environment."15 The regulations use language identical to that found in the mainstreaming mandate to state
the broad obligation of the local educational agency." However,
the regulations specifically require participating educational agencies to provide a "continuum of alternative placements" to meet the
needs of children in need of special education and related services." The continuum of alternative placements is to range from
the least restrictive to the most restrictive (regular classroom, special classes, special schools, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions). 1 0 Further, the school district must provide
for supplementary services such as resource room or itinerant instruction in conjunction with a regular class placement. 1
Placements of children with disabilities are to be based on the
child's individual education program ("IEP") 62 which should include any modifications to the regular educational program necessary for the child to participate. 6 The rules mandate placement as
close to the child's home as possible, and placement in the child's
home school unless the child's IEP requires otherwise. 64 Notwithstanding such a preference for mainstreaming, consideration is to be
Rights and Remedies, 17 J. L. & EDUC. 625 (1988). Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 ("ADA") is an additional vehicle for parents seeking a remedy for discriminatory
educational practices. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (Supp. V 1993). For a brief description of ADA provisions germane to special education issues, see infra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
157. 34 C.F.R. § 300.550-556 (1993).
158. Compare id. § 300.550(b)(1)-(2) with 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (Supp. V 1993). Both the
Regulations and the statute state:
Each public agency shall ensure (1) That to the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including
children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with
children who are non-disabled; and
(2) That special classes, separate schooling or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity
of the disability is such that education in the regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
159. 34 C.F.R. § 300.551(a) (1993).
160. Id. § 300.551(b)(1).
161. Id.§ 300.551(b)(2).
162. Id.§ 300.552(a)(2).
163. Id. at App. C - Notice of Interpretation, Question No. 48, cited as authority in Daniel
R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989) and Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216.
164. Id. § 300.552(a)(3)(c).
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given to the potential harm the placement poses to the child, and to
the quality of services the child needs. 165 The Comment to section
300.552 of the regulations emphasizes that the overriding requirement for schools is that placement decisions be made on an individual basis.1"6 This emphasis on individualized placement underscores
the importance of a continuum of placement alternatives to accom1 67
modate individual requirements.
F.

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the
Education of Children with Disabilities

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990168 ("ADA") is another statute under which children with disabilities and their parents are afforded sweeping protections against the exclusionary and
discriminatory practices of local educational agencies. An in-depth
analysis of the significance of the ADA for special education is beyond the scope of this Comment. 69 However, a familiarity with
some of its provisions will later inform the analysis of the mainstreaming mandate of the IDEA.
Congress's overall policy with respect to individuals with disabilities is nowhere more strongly stated than in the findings voiced in
the ADA.' 7 ° Three findings are of particular relevance to this Comment. First, Congress notes that discrimination against individuals
with disabilities persists in education.' Secondly, Congress specifically identified the following as forms of discrimination: the "failure
to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria," and segregation. 7 Finally,
Congress stated that individuals with disabilities are deserving of
"equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
165. Id. § 300.552(d).
166. Id. § 300.552 cmt. ("The overriding rule on this section is that placement decisions must
be made on an individualized basis.").
167. See id. (stating that regulations "require[] each agency to have various alternative placements available in order to ensure that each [disabled] child receives an education that is appropriate to his or her individual needs") (emphasis added).
168. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993).
169. For a discussion of the accessibility requirements imposed on schools by Title II of the
ADA, see WEBER, supra note 11,§§ 23.1 - 23.5 (Supp. 1994).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (Supp. V 1993) (listing nine Congressional findings which inspired

the drafting of the ADA).
171. Id. § 12101(a)(3).
172. Id.

§

12101(a)(5).
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economic self-sufficiency."' 173
In general, the ADA bars discrimination on the basis of disability
in the areas of employment, public services, private provision of
public accommodations and services, and telecommunications. 7' Title II of the ADA, which bans discrimination in the provision of
public services, is most relevant for the purposes of this Comment
since state and local educational agencies are covered under this title.'M The ADA requires that a "qualified individual with a disability" not be "excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits
of the services, programs, or activities of a [State or local government]" or be otherwise discriminated against by such entity. 7" An
individual with a disability is "qualified" if
with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, and practices, the
removal of architectural, communication, and transportation barriers, or the
provision of auxiliary aids and services, [he or she] meets the essential eligi-

bility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities
government].177

provided by a[n]

[agency

of a state or local

As suggested by the foregoing provision, there are limits to what
public entities must do to make public programs and activities accessible to individuals with disabilities. Regulations promulgated by
the Department of Justice state that a public entity does not have to
modify its programs or activities if the result would be a "fundamental alteration in the nature of

. .

. the program, or activity or

[impose] undue financial and administrative burdens.' 8
The foregoing statutory and regulatory provisions of the ADA
may help to elucidate the precise dimensions of the IDEA's mainstreaming mandate. However, the courts. have yet to consider the
implications of the ADA for the mainstreaming issue. 79 Rather, judicial opinions on the issue have focused on (1) what test the IDEA
173. Id. 9 12101(a)(8).
174. Id. §9 12101-12213 (The ADA is divided into four main Subchapters titled "Employment," "Public Services," "Public Accommodations & Services Operated by Private Entities,"
and "Miscellaneous Provisions").
175. Id. § 12131(1)(B) (defining "public entity" as "any department, agency, special purpose
district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government").
176. Id.§ 12132.
177. Id.§ 12131(2).

178. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (1993).
179. Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the U.S. Department of Education,
Office for Civil Rights, has barred the exclusion or segregation of children with disabilities in a
variety of a cases. WEBER, supra note 11, § 23.2(3) (Supp. 1994).
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mandates for child placement decisions,1 80 and (2) the proper scope
of judicial review of placement decisions." 1
G.

The MainstreamingMandate and the Courts

It was inevitable that the broad language of the mainstreaming
mandate would require the courts to step in and define the precise
obligation the mandate imposed on the states.182 Although the
United States Supreme Court has not interpreted the mainstreaming mandate, the Court's landmark decision in Board of Education
v. Rowley 8 ' is the starting point for any discussion of the subject.
1. Board of Education v. Rowley
In Board of Education v. Rowley,"" the Supreme Court resolved
two issues: (1) what is the substantive standard the states must satisfy to comply with the IDEA's requirement that states provide a
"free appropriate public education" to children with disabilities; 85
and (2) what is the proper scope of review for cases brought under
the IDEA.'
Rowley involved the special education of a deaf child named
Amy.' 87 After Amy was denied the services of a sign-language interpreter in her regular first-grade classroom, her parents brought a
complaint under the IDEA.' 88 The hearing examiner ruled for the
school administration, concluding that Amy was "achieving educationally, academically, and socially" with the services already provided - a hearing aid, tutoring and speech therapy.189 The examiner's decision was affirmed on appeal to the State Commissioner of
Education, but reversed by the federal district court."90 The district
court's decision was then affirmed by a divided panel of the United
180. See infra notes 184-340 and accompanying text (discussing the different tests used by the

courts in applying the mainstreaming mandate).
181. See infra notes 184-340 and accompanying text (discussing the differing interpretations of
the appropriate scope of judicial review).
182. For examples of the differing interpretations of the mainstreaming mandate, see infra
notes 184-340 and accompanying text.
183. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 179-203.
186. Id. at 205-07.
187. Id. at 184.
188. Id. at 185.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 185-86.
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States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 191
Then Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, flatly rejected
the federal district court's conclusion that a "free appropriate public
education" requires that children with disabilities receive "an opportunity to achieve [their] full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided other children." 192 The Court declined to interpret the IDEA's requirement that children with disabilities receive a
"free appropriate public education" to mean that the states are required to provide educational opportunity or services equal to that
provided children without disabilities.193 After reviewing the legislative history, Justice Rehnquist concluded that Congress did not
think that equal protection for children with disabilities required
anything more than equal or meaningful access to a free public
education.19
However, the Court acknowledged that Congress' financial commitment to educating children with disabilities implied a requirement that the education provided "confer some educational benefit
upon the handicapped child."'I9 Thus, the Court concluded that the
"basic floor of opportunity" which Congress requires 9 6 "consists of
access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped
child."' 97 Additionally, the instruction and services must be provided at no cost to the child, meet the state's educational standards,
"approximate the grade levels used in the State's regular education," and comport with the child's IEP developed in compliance
with the Act.' 9 8
The Court did not establish a single test for determining the adequacy of the educational benefit conferred on a child with disabili191. Id. at 186.
192. Id. at 185-86 (quoting Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (1980)).
193. Id. at 198.
194. Id. at 192. The Court stated "the intent of the Act was more to open the door of public
education to handicapped children . . .than to guarantee any particular level of education once

inside." Id. It went on to note that "neither the Act nor its history persuasively demonstrates that
Congress thought that equal protection required anything more than equal access." Id. at 200.

195. Id.
196. See id. (noting the need for a "precise guarantee for handicapped children, i.e. a basic
floor of opportunity that would bring into compliance all school districts with the constitutional
right of equal protection") (quoting HOUSE REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1975)).
197. Id. at 201.
198. Id. at 203. The IEP is an "individualized educational plan" developed by the child's parents or guardians, teacher and qualified representative from the school district. For the statutory
definition, see supra note 139.
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ties, saying only that where the child is being educated in the regular classroom, the school's grading and advancement system is an
"important factor" in appraising the educational benefit.199 Thus,
the Court held as dispositive the district court's own finding that the
child "is receiving an 'adequate' education, since she performs better than the average child in her class and is advancing easily from
20 0
grade to grade.
Turning to the issue of the proper standard of review under the
Act,20 1 the Court steered a middle path between the views of the
Rowleys and the school district.20 After reviewing the legislative
history, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Act required more
than a "substantial evidence" standard of review 20 and rejected the
school district's view that the scope of judicial review was limited to
procedural matters.2 0 4 The Court, however, also rejected the
Rowley's position that the Act required de novo review of both procedural and substantive issues.2 0 5 Acknowledging that the Act required courts to make independent decisions based on a "preponderance of the evidence," the Court nevertheless read the Act to limit
the scope of review to two inquiries: "First, has the State complied
with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized education program . . . reasonably calculated to enable the
child to receive educational benefits?"12 0 6 While this standard requires a minimal inquiry into the level of education the child is receiving, the Court emphasized that courts are precluded from questioning the educational methods adopted by the schools.2 7
Extending judicial review to matters of educational methodology, it
199. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203.
200. Id. at 209-10. (quoting Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y.

1980)).
201. For a description of the judicial review provisions of the IDEA, see supra notes 151-56
and accompanying text.
202. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205-06.
203. Id. "[Substantial evidence] is more than a mere scintilla and means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1428 (6th ed. 1990). While the "substantial evidence" standard of review is broader than the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard, a rational distinction between "substantial evidence,"
"clearly erroneous," and "clear error of judgment" is difficult to make in light of conflicting Supreme Court precedent. 5 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29:5 (2d ed.
1984).
204. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205-06.
205. Id. at 204-06.
206. Id. at 206-07.
207. Id. at 207-08 (emphasis added). "[O]nce a court determines that the requirements of the
Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States." Id.
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argued, would involve the courts in "persistent and difficult questions of educational policy" they are not competent to resolve, a result the majority did not believe Congress intended when it passed
the IDEA. 20 8 Thus, if the reviewing court finds that the school has
complied with the procedural requirements of the Act, and the
child's IEP is "reasonably calculated" to confer an educational benefit, "the courts can require no more. ' 20 9 Since, in the instant case,
the district court had expressly found that Amy was receiving an
"adequate" education, and the district court had not ruled on the
parents' claim that the school had failed to comply with procedural
requirements, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for consideration of the procedural issue. 10
The mainstreaming mandate was not at issue in Rowley because
Amy had been "mainstreamed" and was capable of mastering the
regular education curriculum. 2 1 Nevertheless, the lower courts have

at times based their review of placement decisions on the two-step
inquiry set forth in Rowley."' Whether the Rowley formulation is
appropriate for analyzing placement decisions will be more fully explored in a latter discussion. 1
208. Id. at 208 (citation omitted) (quoting San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
42 (1973)).
209. Id. at 206-07 (emphasis added). The Court cited two grounds in support of its limitation
of judicial review to primarily procedural matters. Id. at 206. First, the court concluded that
contrasting the elaborate procedural safeguards enumerated in the Act with the "imprecise substantive" provisions of the Act evinced Congress's view that procedural safeguards insuring the
participation of parents and guardians would "in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP." Id. The Act's emphasis on the procedural obligations assumed by the states, the Court argues, would be frustrated by de novo review
of the IEP's substance. Id.; see also id. at 208-09 (citing the protections accorded children
through parental involvement on "advisory boards" and in the formulation of state plans and
IEPs). Secondly, the Court quoted from section 1413(a)(3) of the Act, which requires states to
"acquir[e] and disseminat[e] to teachers and administrators of programs for [disabled] children
significant information derived from educational research, demonstration and similar projects, and
[to] adopt[], where appropriate, promising educational practices and materials." Id. at 207. Based
on this "clear statutory directive," the Court concluded that it was "highly unlikely that Congress
intended courts to overturn a State's choice of appropriate educational theories." Id. Rather, the
foregoing provision was evidence of Congress's historic and current awareness of the States' primary role in formulating educational policy. Id. at 208.
210. Id. at 210.
211. Id. at 202.
212. See infra notes 303-32 and accompanying text (discussing the deferential approach to the
mainstreaming mandate).
213. See infra notes 468-500 and accompanying text (arguing that the courts should limit the
application of the Rowley test to its facts).

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:599

2. Decisions of the Federal Courts of Appeals214
Since Rowley, the lower courts have not only had to grapple with
the question of what the mainstreaming mandate requires, but have
also had to discern what, if any, significance the two-step Rowley
inquiry has for judicial review of placement decisions. One of the
first federal appellate court decisions to confront these issues was
Roncker v. Walter.21
a.

The Roncker Feasibility Test

Roncker v. Walter1 involved a severely mentally retarded child
who was denied placement in a setting where he could have contact
with non-disabled children.2 " A panel of the Sixth Circuit distinguished Rowley, concluding that the issue of whether a disabled
child's education is "appropriate" is different from the issue of
whether the child has been placed in compliance with the mainstreaming mandate.21 8 Nevertheless, the court ambiguously concluded that the "proper [mainstreaming] inquiry is whether a proposed placement is appropriate under the Act."2 9
The test announced by the court requires that where a segregated
facility is found to be superior to a non-segregated facility, the court
is to determine whether the services which make the facility supe2 0 If
rior "could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting.
education in the non-segregated facility is feasible, then it would not
be appropriate to confine the child to the segregated facility." 1 The
court's feasibility test allowed consideration of the following factors:
(1) whether the child would benefit from mainstreaming; (2)
whether the benefits from mainstreaming are far outweighed by the
benefits of receiving services not available in the mainstream setting;
(3) whether the child would be a "disruptive force" in the mainstream setting; and (4) the cost of mainstreaming the child. 212 The
214. This discussion describes federal appellate court cases representative of leading approaches
to the mainstreaming issue. For a more detailed description of the relevant cases, see WEBER,
supra note 11, §§ 9.1-9.2.
215. 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1060.
218. Id. at 1062.
219. Id. at 1063.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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court noted, however, that cost is not a defense where the school has
failed to provide a continuum of alternative placements.2 2 Finding
that the lower court had erroneously applied an "abuse of discretion" standard to the school's placement decision, the Roncker court
remanded the case for re-examination of the mainstreaming issue. 2
b.

The Daniel R.R. Two-Step Inquiry

In Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education,2 25 a panel of the
Fifth Circuit agreed with the court in Roncker that the two-part
Rowley test did not apply to mainstreaming cases. 22 However, the
court declined to adopt the Roncker feasibility test, contending that
the Roncker test was too intrusive an inquiry into the educational
policy choices of educators. 27 Consequently, the court formulated
its own two-step inquiry to analyze the placement decision for a sixyear-old boy named Daniel afflicted with Downs Syndrome. 2 The
test is derived from the language of the mainstreaming requirement:
(1) whether, with the use of supplementary aids and services, the
child's education can be achieved satisfactorily in the regular classroom; and (2) if not, whether the child has been mainstreamed to
the maximum extent appropriate. 29
Acknowledging that the mainstreaming analysis is an "individual223. Id.
224. Id. at 1062-63. The Roncker test has been adopted by panels of the Eighth and Fourth
Circuits as well. In A.W. v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1987), the court
approved the cost/benefit analysis the trial court applied to the placement of a boy with Down's
Syndrome. Id. at 163. The court held that the cost of removing the child from an institution for
disabled children was not justified by the marginal benefits of educating the child in a regular
school. Id. at 163-64. The court refused to consider the parents' contention that the school's arguments based on cost were undermined by the failure of the school to provide a "continuum of
alternative placements" as required by 30 C.F.R. § 300.551. Id. at 164 n.9. Judicial inquiry into
the range of placement options available for disabled children would in the court's view require
review of the school's educational policies - review beyond the scope of review permitted by the
United States Supreme Court in Rowley. Id.
In DeVries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1989), a panel affirmed the
school's decision to place a seventeen-year-old autistic boy named Michael in a county vocational
school rather than his local high school. Id. at 877. The court held that even with the assistance of
an aide, Michael would be "simply monitoring classes" with non-disabled students. Id. at 879.
The court did not contemplate any accommodations in addition to the provision of an aide and
concluded that Michael's particular educational needs could not be accommodated in the regular
high school. Id. at 879-80.
225. 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989).
226. Id. at 1045.
227. Id. at 1046.
228. Id. at 1039.
229. Id. at 1048 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B)).
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ized, fact-specific inquiry" and that the factors employed by the
court are not exhaustive, the court identified the four relevant factors for part one of its inquiry. 280 First, the court looked to see if the
school had taken more than token steps to accommodate Daniel's
needs in the regular education classroom through the provision of
supplementary aids and services.2 31 Though the court stated that the
requirement to accommodate is broad, it does not require the
teacher to act as a special education teacher in a regular education
class. 232 Nor is the school expected to so radically modify the curriculum that the child is receiving a special education in the regular
education classroom.233 The court concluded that here the school
had taken sufficient steps to accommodate Daniel's disability -the
child's teacher made "genuine and creative efforts to reach Daniel,"
modified his curriculum, and spent a disproportionate amount of her
time attending to him.23 4
Secondly, the court examined whether, given Daniel's mental retardation and speech impairment, he was receiving an educational
benefit from mainstreaming.235 The court concluded that Daniel was
receiving little, if any educational benefit from participation in regular pre-kindergarten other than the "opportunity to associate with
nonhandicapped students. 2 30
Thirdly, the court balanced the benefits of mainstreaming against
the benefits of a segregated setting allowing for greater attention to
Daniel's unique needs.23 7 Here, the court had no trouble concluding
that the marginal social benefits Daniel received from mainstreaming were outweighed by the clear educational benefits he received
from a self-contained special education program.238
Finally, the court inquired into what negative effect Daniel would
have on the education of other children in the regular education
classroom.239 Citing the regulations implementing the mainstreaming mandate, the court held that where a disabled "child is so disruptive in a regular classroom that the education of other students is
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 1048-50.
Id. at 1048.
Id. at 1048-49.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

Id.

1050.
1049.
1050.
1049.
1051.
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significantly impaired," mainstreaming is not appropriate.2 4 0 Here,
the court agreed with the school that the demand Daniel made on
the teacher's time was not fair to the other students.2 4 1 Taking all
four factors into account, 42 the court held that Daniel could not be
educated satisfactorily in the regular classroom, and that mainstreaming him for lunch and recess satisfied the requirement to
mainstream the child to the "maximum extent appropriate. 24 3
Nominally more deferential to school authority than the Roncker
test, the "individualized, fact-specific" inquiry advanced by Daniel
R.R. proved to be anything but deferential in Greer v. Rome City
School District. In that case, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit also
followed those circuits rejecting the applicability of the Rowley test
for mainstreaming cases.2 4 5 Instead, the court adopted the two-part
inquiry set forth in Daniel R.R. Greer involved a ten-year-old child
named Christy who had Downs Syndrome. Applying the two-part
Daniel R.R. inquiry to the facts of the case, the court held that the
school had failed the first step of the inquiry by not taking sufficient
action to accommodate Christy in the regular classroom. 2 " Specifically, the school had not considered the "full range of supplemental
aids and services, including resource rooms and itinerant instruction,
that could be provided to assist Christy in the regular classroom. '"247
The court charged the school with basing its placement decision on
its assessment of the severity of Christy's disability without consideration of what supplemental aids and services could have been provided to accommodate her disability. 8 In fact, the court noted that
the only supplemental service considered by the school was "some
speech therapy. ' 249 The school also failed to consider modification
of the regular education curriculum, and developed Christy's IEP
before meeting with the child's parents. 50
240. Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.552 cmt. (1993)).
241. Id.

242. The panel noted that the Sixth Circuit considered cost as a limited factor in the mainstreaming analysis. However, the court did not consider cost here since neither party had raised it
as an issue. Id. at 1049 n.9.
243. Id. at 1050.
244. 950 F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 956 F.2d 1025 (11th Cir.

1992).
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 696 n.25.
Id. at 698.
Id.
Id.
Id.

250. Id.
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The court would not credit the school's determination that
Christy would benefit more from a self-contained special education
than an education in the regular classroom, since the school had not
compared the segregated educational opportunity with education in
the regular classroom with supplementary aids and services.25 Finally, the court noted that Christy was no longer "unusually disruptive" in the classroom, and that the school adduced no evidence that
25 2
educating Christy in the regular classroom would be too costly.
Significantly, the court noted that its analysis was not a foray into
the educational methodology choices of the school.2 If the school
complies with the mainstreaming requirements of the Act, "due deference will be accorded to school officials' choice of methodologies
for educating Christy." 4
More recently, the two-part Daniel R.R. inquiry was applied even
more stringently by a panel of the Third Circuit in Oberti v. Board
of Education.25 5 In that case, the plaintiff-appellee Rafael Oberti,
an eight-year-old boy suffering from Downs Syndrome, sought inclusion in a regular education class. 5 6 At the outset, the court
deemed the two-step test formulated in Rowley inapplicable to the
mainstreaming issue.2 Acknowledging that the Act reserves questions of educational policy for state and local governments2 58 the
court nevertheless cited Rowley for the proposition that the Act
"'requires participating States to educate [disabled] children with
[non-disabled] children whenever possible.' "59 The Supreme
Court's admonition not to interfere in decisions relating to educational methodology was not, in the court's view, inconsistent with
the court's duty to enforce the statutory mainstreaming
requirement. 60
Taking up the Daniel R.R. inquiry, the court reiterated the first
factor, which requires the school to give "serious consideration" to
including the child in the regular classroom with the provision of
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
1988),

Id.
Id. at 698-99.
Id. at 699.
Id.
995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1206-07.
Id. at 1214.
Id. (citing Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982)).
Id. (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202).
Id. (citing Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 184 (3d Cir.
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989)).
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supplementary aids and services and modifications to the regular education program. 61 The court followed Greer in requiring the school
to consider "'the whole range of supplemental aids and services, including resource rooms and itinerant instruction.' ",262 In addition,
the court expanded the list of services in Greer to include "speech
and language therapy, special education training for the regular
teacher, behavior modification programs, or any other available aids
or services appropriate to the child's particular disabilities."I" This
goes beyond the expectation imposed by the court in Daniel R.R.,
where the court concluded that "[s]tates need not provide every conceivable supplementary aid or service to assist the child [in the regular classroom]. ' 264
The Oberti court then turned to the second factor: consideration
of whether the benefits of inclusion with supplementary aids and
services outweighs the benefits conferred in a segregated, special education classroom.26 5 Here, the court noted that the school is not
only to consider the non-academic benefits of inclusion, for example,
the development of social and communication skills and improved
self-esteem, but it also must be mindful that because "a child with
disabilities will learn differently . . . within a regular classroom
does not justify exclusion from that environment. 266
While the Oberti court cited Daniel R.R. for the proposition that
children with disabilities may learn differently from their non-disabled peers in the regular classroom, 6 7 the court in Daniel R.R. saw
the second factor of its inquiry as "focus[ing] on the student's ability to grasp the essential elements of the regular education curriculum. ' ' 29 Also, notwithstanding the Daniel R.R. court's expectation
that the curriculum should be modified for the child,2 69 when applying the second factor the court noted that Daniel could not master
the skills developed by the regular curriculum and could not master
261. Id. at 1215-16.
262. Id. (quoting Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 696 (1 lth Cir. 1991), vacated
on other grounds, 956 F.2d 1025 (11th Cir. 1992)).

263. Id. at 1216.
264. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989).
265. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216. The second factor of the first step of the Daniel R.R. test is here
combined with the third factor. Thus, the four factors in Daniel R.R. are reduced to three.
266. Id. at 1217. The "reciprocal benefits of inclusion to the nondisabled students in the class"
should also be considered. Id. at 1217 n.24.
267. Id. at 1217.
268. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1049.
269. Id. at 1048.
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most of the lessons.'1 0 Thus, the Oberti court expanded the second
factor of the Daniel R.R. inquiry by not limiting the educational
benefits of inclusion to those which non-disabled children are ex11
pected to derive from the regular classroom curriculum.
Finally, the court set forth the "excessive disruption" factor in the
Daniel R.R. inquiry.' 7 ' However, here the court emphasized that
"[a]n adequate individualized program with . . . aids and services
may prevent disruption that would otherwise occur.' 7 Thus, a behavioral problem incident to the child's disability is an issue that
should initially be addressed through the provision of supplementary
aids and services and modification of the curriculum.'
The Oberti court also adopted the second step of the Daniel R.R.
inquiry, requiring that children not placed in the regular classroom
be mainstreamed to "the maximum extent appropriate.' 27 5 This requirement contemplates that schools provide a "'continuum of alternative placements . . . to meet the needs of [disabled]
children.' ,276
Engaging in the first step of the Daniel R.R. inquiry, the court
applied all three factors to the placement of Rafael Oberti. The
court held that the district court's findings that the school had not
taken "meaningful steps" to include Rafael in the regular classroom
with supplementary aids and services was not "clearly erroneous. '"27
The district court determined that the school district had made only
negligible or perfunctory efforts to include Rafael in the regular
classroom.27 8 For instance, one year Rafael was placed in a developmental kindergarten class without a curriculum plan, a behavior
management plan, or adequate special education support to the
teacher.'
270. Id. at 1050.
271. See Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1217 (stating that a child with disabilities may learn differently
from his education in the regular classroom and that states are not required to provide disabled
children with "the same educational experience ... as is generally provided for nondisabled children") (citing Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189, 202 (1982)).
272. Id. The Oberti court recognized that cost may be a relevant factor, but since the parties
did not raise the issue, the court did not consider it. Id. at 1218 n.25.
273. Id. (citing Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11 th Cir. 1991), vacated on
other grounds, 956 F.2d 1025 (11 th Cir. 1992)).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1218.

276. Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.551(a) (1993)).
277. Id.at 1221.
278. Id.at 1220.
279. Id.
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As to the second factor, a comparison of the benefits of a segregated versus non-segregated education, the court agreed with the
trial court that the Oberti's experts demonstrated that educational
methods effective for teaching Rafael could be used in the regular
classroom.2 80 Furthermore, despite conflicting testimony, the court
did not find clearly erroneous the trial court's determination that the
teacher could be trained to implement these methods and communicate effectively with Rafael without disrupting the class or converting it into a special education class.2 81 Additionally, the court
agreed with the trial court's legal conclusion that modification of the
curriculum is "'not a legitimate basis upon which to justify excluding a child' unless the education of other students is significantly
impaired. ' 82
The record on the third factor - the potentially disruptive effect
of Rafael's presence - also contained conflicting evidence.28 8 However, the court did not find clearly erroneous the trial court's conclusion that with adequate supplementary aids and services - such as
special education training for the teacher, the assistance of an itinerant special education instructor, parallel instruction to allow Rafael to learn at his academic level, modification of the curriculum,
and use of a resource room - Rafael would not pose a disruption. 284 Thus, the court affirmed the decision of the trial court that
the school district had failed to meets its burden of proof that Rafael could not be "satisfactorily" educated in the regular classroom
with supplementary aids and services. 88
c. The Rachel H. Balancing Test
In Sacramento City Unified School District v. Rachel H.,286 a
panel of the Ninth Circuit recently adopted a test that draws on
factors found in both Roncker and Daniel R.R.287 The court applied
a four-factor balancing test to the placement decision for Rachel
280. Id. at 1221.
281. Id. at 1222.
282. Id. (quoting Oberti v. Board of Educ., 801 F. Supp. 1392, 1403 (DN.J. 1992), affd, 995
F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993)).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1223.
285. Id.
286. 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir, 1994).
287. Id. at 1404.
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Holland, a moderately retarded girl who is now eleven years old. 88
The factors the court considered were: "(1) the educational benefits
of placement full-time in a regular class; (2) the non-academic benefits of such placement; (3) the effect Rachel had on the teacher and
children in the regular class; and (4) the costs of mainstreaming
Rachel."289 Reviewing the district court's fact findings for "clear error,"2 90 the court affirmed the lower court decision upholding
Rachel's full-time placement in a regular classroom. 91
Specifically, the court would not disturb the lower court's findings, after a full evidentiary hearing and analysis, that Rachel's
educational goals could be implemented in the regular classroom
with some modification of the curriculum and assistance of a parttime aid. 292 The court also did not find clear error in the lower
court's finding that Rachel derived valuable non-academic benefits
from full inclusion in the regular education classroom.2 93 Addressing
the issue of what adverse effect educating Rachel in the regular
classroom would have on the education of other students, the panel
simply noted that both parties agreed that Rachel was not disruptive
in class. 94 In addition, Rachel's second grade teacher testified that
with the assistance of a part-time aid, Rachel did not interfere with
her ability to teach the other children in the class.295 Finally, the
panel agreed that the school district's contention that mainstreaming Rachel would be cost-prohibitive was not persuasive. 296
The Ninth Circuit in Rachel H. did not even consider the twopart Rowley formula, 97 nor did it consider the United States Supreme Court's admonition to refrain from engaging in review of disputes involving educational methodology.2 98 Rather, the court implicitly approved of the trial court's full evidentiary hearing,
including the introduction of expert testimony, on the issue of
288. Id. at 1400.
289. Id. at 1404.
290. Id. at 1402. The "clearly erroneous" standard permits reversal only when "the reviewing
court on entire evidence is left with [the] definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 251 (6th ed. 1990).
291. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1405.
292. Id. at 1401, 1404.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1401.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1401-02, 1404.
297. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), is only cited once in a footnote to explain
the purpose of the IEP. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1400 n.2.
298. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-08 n.29.
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whether Rachel was receiving academic benefits in the regular classroom. 299 Resolution of this issue required the district court to evaluate the extent to which special educational methods could be successfully used in the regular classroom. 300 The district court found
the testimony of Rachel's experts more credible, having "more background in evaluating [disabled] children placed in regular classrooms, and . . .greater opportunity to observe Rachel over an extended period of time." 8 1 The Ninth Circuit did not disturb this
finding or criticize the district court's scope of review.302
d.

The Deferential Approach

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Rachel H. is in stark contrast
with its decision in Wilson v. Marana Unified School District,303 a
case representative of a highly deferential approach to the placement decision. In Wilson, the Ninth Circuit was faced with an appeal by parents seeking to block the transfer of their physically disabled daughter Jessica from a regular classroom to a segregated
special education program.30 The school's position was that it was
required by state law to provide Jessica with a special education
teacher certified in physical disabilities. 30 5 The court, however, did
not find this point of state law to be the controlling issue.3" Rather,
the court defined the issue as whether, after having determined that
a student with disabilities is not making "satisfactory progress" in
the then current placement, the school has the power to transfer the
student to a school where she can receive assistance from a teacher
especially qualified in her disability.30 7 The parents argued that
transferring Jessica violated the mainstreaming mandate of the
IDEA.30 8 The court disagreed, holding that transferring a child to a
299. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1401, 1404.
300. See Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 880-82 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (appraising the
conflicting testimony of experts on what setting is more conducive to achieving Rachel's academic
goals), affid sub nom. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir.
1994).

301. Id. at 881.
302. See Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1404 (noting that the district court conducted a complete and
thorough evidentiary hearing and analysis).
303. 735 F.2d 1178 (9th Cir. 1984).
304. Id. at 1180.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1182-83.
308. Id. at 1183.
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more restrictive environment was permissible provided that it was
"reasonably calculated to furnish Jessica a free, appropriate education."' 0 9 Notably, the court characterized the placement decision as
one of educational policy requiring deference to the judgment of local school authorities.310 As in the cases that follow, the placement
decision was analyzed as a question of methodology - the two-part
Rowley test " is applied, and the mainstreaming mandate is satisfied provided that the placement decision is incidental to a decision
312
of educational methodology or policy.
Another case illustrating this approach is Mark A. v. Grant Wood
Area Education Agency,"' 3 decided by a panel of the Eighth Circuit. Here, the parents of a physically and developmentally disabled
girl named Alleah contested the school's decision to remove her
from a private program serving both children with and without disabilities to a segregated special education program in the public
school. 1 The court upheld the transfer, analyzing the issue as one
of "appropriateness." 3 15 The IDEA, the court found, did not require
the school to provide Alleah with the "best educational opportunities." 316 Once the requirements of the Act have been met, "questions of methodology [were] for resolution by the States." 17 Presumably, the methodology referred to by the court was the setting
where Alleah was to be educated. 8 '
The potential conflict between concerns about mainstreaming and
methodology came into sharp relief in Lachman v. Illinois State
Board of Education.19 Lachman involved a dispute between the
parents of a seven-year-old deaf boy named Benjamin and the local
school district. 820 The parents wanted Benjamin to be educated in
the regular education classroom of his neighborhood school with the
309. Id.
310. Id. (citing Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 (1982)).
311. (1) Has the state complied with the procedural requirements of the Act; and (2) is the
IEP reasonably calculated to confer an educational benefit on the child. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 20607.
312. Wilson, 735 F.2d at 1183.
313. 795 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 936 (1987).
314. Id. at 53.

315. Id. at 54.
316. Id.
317. Id. (quoting Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 (1982)).
318. See id. (stating in dicta that Iowa does not have integrated public pre-school education
programs and that the mainstreaming mandate does not require that the state provide them).
319. 852 F.2d 290 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 925 (1988).
320. Id.
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assistance a full-time cued speech instructor.3 2 1 The school district,
on the other hand, wanted to educate Benjamin at a regional institution for the deaf which employed a "total communication" method
consisting primarily of sign language.322
The trial court analyzed the dispute as one over methodology and,
applying the two-part Rowley test, concluded that the school district
had provided Benjamin with a "free appropriate public education. 32 3 On appeal, the parents contended that the controlling issue
was not methodology, but whether Benjamin's individualized education program ("IEP") complied with the mainstreaming requirement. 2 The Seventh Circuit agreed that a mainstreaming issue was
properly presented; however, the court concluded that the mainstreaming determination "can be made only within the context of
the methodology employed to facilitate [Benjamin's] education." 23
Under Rowley, the primary responsibility for "choosing the educational method most suitable to the child's needs, was left by the Act
to state and local educational agencies. 3 2 6 Since the school believed
that the "total communication" method was the most appropriate
method of communication for Benjamin, the court deferred to the
school's judgment. 7
While the dispute in Lachman was at least in part over methodol32 8
ogy, the dispute in Briggs v. Board of Education
was solely one of
whether James, a hearing-impaired child, was mainstreamed as required by law. " 9 Here, the Second Circuit overturned a district
court decision which, following the analysis in Roncker, held that
the educational services proposed for James could be provided in a
less restrictive setting 30 The court opined that the district court's
scope of review is confined to the two-part Rowley formula: (1)
whether the state complied with the procedural requirements of the
Act; and (2) whether the IEP was reasonably calculated to confer
educational benefits on the child.331 Observing that the decision to
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

291.
291-92.
293-94.
294.
296.

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id. (citing Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982)).
Id. at 297.
882 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 689-91.
Id. at 691.
Id.
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place James in a segregated program was the outcome
process involving the best judgment of local educational
court held that disturbing the decision of the school was
to imposing on the state the court's own views on
33 2
policy.
3.
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of the IEP
experts, the
tantamount
educational

Two Points of Conflict in the Federal Circuits

As the foregoing discussion illustrates, judicial approaches to the
mainstreaming issue are marked by considerable disagreement. Two
significant points of conflict will be identified now, and fully analyzed in the next section of this Comment.
First, courts are divided on the issue of whether the IDEA requires schools to make modifications to the regular education curriculum and instructional methodology to accommodate the inclusion
of children with disabilities. 3 One view, illustrated by Daniel R.R.,
is that the mainstreaming mandate does not require provision of
special education in the regular classroom." 4 Rather, the focus
should be on whether the child can "grasp the essential elements of
the regular education curriculum. 33 5 In contrast, the Oberti court
concluded that "the fact that a child with disabilities will learn differently . ..within a regular classroom does not justify exclusion
from that environment. '336 Thus, the educational benefits that inclusion can confer on a disabled child should not be adjudged by
reference to the child's capacity to grasp the regular education curriculum, but rather, the child's ability to make satisfactory progress
toward the goals developed in his or her "individualized education
program. 33a
Secondly, some courts have characterized the educational placement decision as one of "methodology," and thus, under the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education v.
Rowley,338 a decision within the sole discretion of local school au332. Id. at 693. The Briggs court did not appear troubled by the fact that the parents disagreed
with the IEP.
333. See infra notes 377-96 and accompanying text (discussing whether the requirement to
facilitate inclusion through the provision of "supplementary aids and services" includes a requirement to make reasonable modifications to the regular educational program).

334. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048-49 (5th Cir. 1989).
335. Id. at 1049.
336. Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1217 (3d Cir. 1993).
337. See id. (discussing school's obligation under the Act to provide supplementary aids and
services to accommodate the child's disabilities in the regular classroom).
338. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
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thorities.3 39 Other courts, however, have taken the view that enforcing the mainstreaming mandate is not inconsistent with concerns for
local autonomy in matters of educational methodology. 40
While these two conflicts are by no means exhaustive, they involve issues notable for their divisiveness. Resolution of these issues
involves an interpretation of the Act in general, and the mainstreaming provision specifically. The following section advances one
such interpretation of the Act that, at the outset, requires an awareness of the inherent tension that pervades the Act - the tension
between the goals of integration and "special" education.
III. ANALYSIS

A.

The MainstreamingMandate and the Threshold Problem of,
Interpretation

The difficulty encountered in interpreting the IDEA stems in part
from the tension courts and commentators have observed between
the requirement that children with disabilities be provided special
education - an individualized education which recognizes their
unique needs 41 - and Congress's strong preference that children
with disabilities be desegregated.34 2 In other words, Congress requires schools to treat children with disabilities differently than children without disabilities, underscoring their uniqueness, while on the
other hand preferring that schools educate children with disabilities
children, emphasizing their commonality
alongside non-disabled
3 43
children.
other
with
339. See supra notes 303-32 and accompanying text (discussing the deferential approach fostered by Rowley).
340. See infra notes 468-500 and accompanying text (discussing educational methodology and
the mainstreaming issue).
341. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(20), 1414(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993); see id. § 1412(4) (requiring local
educational agencies to maintain records of each disabled child).
342. Id. § 1412(5)(B); see Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1214 n.18 (3d Cir. 1993)
(stating that the IDEA "embodies an express tension between its two substantive commitments to
the 'appropriate education' and to the 'least restrictive alternative' ") (quoting Minow, supra note
124, at 181)); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 695 (11 th Cir. 1991) (noting tension
between two goals of mainstreaming and "meeting each child's unique needs"), vacated on other
grounds, 956 F.2d 1025 (11th Cir. 1992); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1044
(5th Cir. 1989) (concluding that the statutory preference for mainstreaming creates a tension
between two provisions of the Act).
343. This tension is also manifested in other provisions of the Act. For example, children are
not eligible for "special education and related services" unless they are labeled as having one or
more of the qualifying disabilities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(l)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993) (defining
the disabilities). Thus, parents are faced with the dilemma of subjecting their children to the
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The mainstreaming provision itself embodies this tension by limiting inclusion to those instances where it is "appropriate" and the
child's education can still be "achieved satisfactorily. ' 44 Such ambiguity, however, does not mean the mainstreaming mandate is
without clear substance. As this Comment attempts to demonstrate,
related provisions and statutes, as well as the Act's legislative history, provide considerable guidance on the substantive requirement
for inclusion. However, the mainstreaming requirement the Act imposes is not a monolithic test, but rather a substantive inquiry the
schools are expected to make concerning a child's educational placement, and a process by which such placement decisions are to be
made and reviewed. 4 5
This inquiry and process derives from a holistic interpretation of
the mainstreaming mandate. This means not only harmonizing the
mainstreaming mandate with other parts of the Act and the Act as
a whole, but also reading the mandate in pari materia with related
statutory schemes. Such an interpretative approach has long been a
canon of statutory construction and is amply supported by the case
law.140 Thus, the mainstreaming inquiry and process outlined here
stigma and limiting effects of being labeled as "disabled" in order to obtain for their children the
"special education and related services" they need. David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children
with Disabilities: Educational Rights and the Construction of Difference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166,
186. The elaborate procedural protections against inappropriate "identification, evaluation, and
educational placement" that the IDEA accords parents suggests that Congress was aware of the
potentially adverse consequences of being labeled "handicapped." See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(A)
(Supp. V 1993) (allowing parents to examine records concerning placement of the child). Thus,
the procedural protections of the Act which in part guard against identifying some children as
different than others creates tension with the provisions conditioning delivery of "special education
and related services" on the presence vel non of one or more specified differences, i.e., disabilities.
Minow, supra note 124, at 179.
344. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
345. The mainstreaming inquiry and process advanced here is suggested in part by the federal
district and appellate court opinions in Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Cal.
1992), afld sub nom. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir.
1994) and Oberti v. Board of Educ., 789 F. Supp. 1322 (D.N.J.), later proceeding, 801 F. Supp.
1392 (D.N.J. 1992), affid, 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993).
346. See 2A SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 46.05 (5th ed. 1992) (discussing statute interpretation and the supporting case law). The "whole statute" interpretation has been expressed in a
number of ways: "A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by
one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole." Id. § 46.05, at 103
(citation omitted).
[S]tatutes must be construed to further the intent of the legislature as evidenced by
the entire statutory scheme; a statutory subsection may not be considered in a vacuum, but must be considered in reference to the statute as a whole and in reference to
statutes dealing with the same general subject matter . . ..
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attempts to construe relevant statutory provisions on the disparate
treatment of disabled children to create a consistent whole."" 7
B.

The Mainstreaming Inquiry

The mainstreaming inquiry is a placement decision based on a set
of rules, values, and relevant considerations. The first rule is that the
placement decision is to be individualized.
1. An Individualized Decision
The most fundamental requirement with respect to the "mainstreaming" decision is that the decision must be made on an individual basis as part of the child's individualized education program
("IEP").3 48 The "placement" decision is part of the larger inquiry
into what is needed to meet the unique educational needs of the
child.3 , 9 The child's IEP involves the parents, teachers, and special
education staff in a "team" inquiry to assess the child's educational
needs, arrive at educational objectives, identify the educational and
related services necessary to achieve those objectives, and determine
the "extent to which [the] child will be able to participate in regular
educational programs. '"360 The Act's emphasis on providing an individualized education was implemented in part by the regulation requiring school districts to provide a "continuum of alternative placeId. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Independent
Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2173, 2182 (1993) (emphasizing that "'[i]n expounding a
statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy' ") (quoting United States v. Heirs of
Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850)); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756
(1979) (interpreting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 consistent with Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in part because the statutes share the common purpose of eliminating discrimination in the workplace).
347. See, e.g., 2A SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST., supra note 346, § 46.05, at 104 (discussing the
comparison of clauses in a statute to determine the "true construction of any particular clause")
(quoting Attorney General v. Sillem, 2 H & C 431, 15 Eng. Repr. 178 (1864)).
348. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(20), 1414(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993) (establishing an individualized
education program for each disabled child); see also Visco v. School Dist. of Pittsburgh, 684 F.
Supp. 1310, 1314 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (noting that "[ilndividualization must be the touchstone for
the [placement] analysis; this value is reflected in the IEP requirement of the Act mandated by
Congress").
349. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (noting that the IEP is a mechanism for
tailoring the child's education to his or her "unique needs"). Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16)
(Supp. V 1993) (defining "special education") with 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(18) (West 1990 &
Supp. 1994) (defining "free appropriate public education").
350. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20)(A)-(C) (Supp. V 1993).
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ments" for disabled children.3 51 This was intended to ensure that a
setting would be available "in which the unique needs of [the] child
can be met ...
" with the least restrictions. 52
The Act is also clear that the placement decision must not be
based on categorical assumptions about the potential of children
with any given disability or label to be satisfactorily educated in the
regular classroom. 53 Additionally, schools are barred from making
placement decisions based on the general perception that a "segregated institution is academically superior for a [disabled] child. 354
While the Act may contemplate the need for more restrictive placements than the regular education classroom, 55 nothing in the Act
contemplates that any particular disability is a legitimate basis for
segregating children. Only if the individual child cannot be satisfactorily educated in the regular classroom is the child to be excluded. 85" Thus, regardless of the child's disability, the child should
be educated in the regular education classroom unless it is determined by the IEP team that the child's unique educational needs
cannot be met there with the provision of supplemental aids and
services.357
2.

The Congressional Preferencefor Inclusion

While Congress may have contemplated the need for more restrictive placements, Congress left no doubt that educating disabled
children alongside their non-disabled peers was to be preferred. 358
State receipt of federal funding for special education is conditioned
on the state establishing
procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, children with
351. 34 C.F.R. § 300.551 (1993).
352. Id. § 300.552 and cmt.
353. See Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989) (adopting
individualized, fact-specific inquiry); Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 878 (E.D. Cal.
1992) (declining to extend inquiry to a group or category of children with disabilities), affd sub
nom. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
354. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983)
(citation omitted).
355. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 n.4 (1982) (pointing out that Congress
"recognized that regular classrooms simply would not be a suitable setting for the education of
many [disabled] children"); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.551 (1993) (requiring schools to provide a
continuum of alternative placements ranging from completely segregated institutionalization to
inclusion in the regular classroom).
356. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (Supp. V 1993).

357. Id.
358. Id.
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disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care

facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and that special
classes, separate schooling, or other removal . . .from the regular educa-

tional environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability
is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids
and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.35

This provision clearly evinces a strong Congressional preference for
educating children with disabilities with their non-disabled peers. 60
Specific provisions of the IDEA other than the mainstreaming
mandate also demonstrate that Congress expected the schools to
prepare for, and prefer, placement of disabled children in the regular classroom. For example, participating states are required to develop and implement personnel training programs which include inservice training of "general" as well as "special education"
instructors and support personnel.3 61 The Senate Report expressly
identifies inservice training as a necessary prerequisite to achieving
"integration of [disabled] children into the classroom" and the
"goal of least restrictive environment[s] for [disabled] children." 362
In addition, participating local school agencies agree to pursue a
goal of providing "to the maximum extent practicable . . .special
services to enable . . .children [with disabilities] to participate in

regular educational programs." ' 63 Regulations promulgated under
the authority of the Act echo this preference for educating children
with disabilities alongside their non-disabled peers. 3 " For example,
the regulations mandate placement as close to the child's home as
possible, and placement in the child's home school unless the child's
359. Id.
360. Id. Numerous courts have recognized this strong preference. See, e.g., DeVries v. Fairfax
County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 878 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that the Act requires mainstreaming
of disabled children into regular classes with non-disabled children); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of
Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that the Act has a strong preference for
mainstreaming); A.W. v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 162 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 847 (1987) (same); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir.) (noting that the
Act requires "mainstreaming be provided to the maximum extent appropriate"), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 864 (1983); Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 878 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (finding that
the Act has a strong preference for mainstreaming), affd, Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court also has acknowledged a Congressional preference for "mainstreaming." Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 n.4 (1982).
361. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
362. S.REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1457.
363. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(iv) (West 1990).
364. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552 (1993).
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IEP requires otherwise. 6
Not only does the language of the statute clearly evince Congress's preference for mainstreaming, the legislative history of the
Act shows that Congress viewed the categorical segregation of children with disabilities as a matter of constitutional dimension. 366 Due
process protections were enacted in part to assure that every child
with a disability is "in fact" afforded an education in the "least restrictive environment." 6 ' Further, segregating students on the basis
of a disability involves labeling children, a practice which itself
poses a threat to individual liberty. 66
In addition, Congressional concern that disabled children achieve
economic self-sufficiency and full participation in the mainstream of
society3 69 has, with the passage of the Americans with Disabilities
37 0
Act ("ADA") in 1990, become a manifest national objective.
Moreover, in the ADA, Congress expressly found that discrimination on the basis of disability persists in education and that segregation is a form of discrimination that "individuals with disabilities
continually encounter. 37 1 In light of our national commitment to
eradicating discrimination on the basis of disability, Congressional
concerns that non-disabled children learn to work and play alongside disabled children take on even greater significance. 7 2 Since the
eradication of prejudice and debilitating stereotypes is a slow and
uncertain process in the best of worlds, children, and their educational communities, may afford the best opportunity the country has
to bring individuals with disabilities into the mainstream. 73
Thus, it is clear that placement in the regular education class365. Id. § 300.552(a)(3), (c).
366. See supra notes 109-30 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the
Act).
367. H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975).
368. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (reiterating the child's liberty interest at
stake when they are mislabeled or placed in overly restrictive environments).
369. For cases which note that the integration of disabled children is a goal of the IDEA, see
Oberti v. Board of Educ., 801 F. Supp. 1392, 1404 (D.N.J. 1992), affd, 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir.
1993); Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied. 488 U.S. 1030 (1989).
370. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (Supp. IV 1992)
(stating that the full participation of disabled individuals is a national goal).
371. Id. § 12101(a)(5).
372. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text (relating the congressional concerns regarding mainstreaming).
373. See Polk, 853 F.2d at 181-82 (discussing the role of self-sufficiency in bringing disabled
children into the mainstream of society).
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room is, in the view of Congress, the preferred placement for children with disabilities. The all-important implication of this conclusion is that school districts should consider placing children with
disabilities in the regular education classroom before exploring other
more restrictive alternatives. 74 No court has more clearly recognized this than the Oberti court. 75 There, a panel of the Third Circuit plainly stated that "[i]f the school has given no serious consideration to including the child in a regular class with ...
supplementary aids and services . . . then it has most likely violated
6 Thus, while the placement
the Act's mainstreaming directive. ' M
decision can be characterized as an individualized, educationaldecision, it is not made in an ideological or political vacuum. Congress
has spoken, and it wants children with disabilities to learn, play, and
someday work alongside non-disabled children.
3. Assistance to Achieve Inclusion
The mainstreaming mandate bars the exclusion of disabled children from the regular classroom unless, given the nature or severity
of the disability, the child's educational goals cannot be "achieved
satisfactorily" in the regular classroom through the provision of
"supplementary aids and services. ' 71 Understandably, the question
of just what "supplementary aids and services" a school is obligated
to provide raises thorny questions3 7 For example, is the obligation
open-ended as suggested by the court in Oberti v. Board of Education,37 9 or limited as suggested by the court in Daniel R.R. v. State
38 0 However, the issue that fundamentally diBoard of Education?
vides the federal courts of appeals is whether the mainstreaming
mandate requires schools to modify the regular education curriculum, in effect providing special education in the regular class374.
1993).
375.
376.
377.

Oberti v. Board of Educ., 801 F. Supp. 1392 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir.
995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1216.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (Supp. V 1993).

378. See generally WEBER, supra note 11,§ 9.3 (discussing the "related services" provision of
the IDEA and its relationship to the "least restrictive environment" provisions of the IDEA).
379. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216 ("[T]he Act and its regulations require schools to provide supplementary aids and services to enable children with disabilities to learn whenever possible in a
regular classroom.").
380. 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989) ("States need not provide every conceivable supplementary aid or service to assist the child.").
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room. 81 This issue takes on added significance in view of the fact
that courts addressing the mainstreaming issue have routinely considered the educational benefits of inclusion in terms of the benefits
of the unmodified regular education program. 82 Since an unmodified regular education program, even with supplementary aids and
services, is not likely to confer an appreciable educational benefit on
disabled children with moderate to severe learning or intellectual
impairments, these children are effectively denied access to the regular classroom on the grounds that a segregated placement is educationally superior.
Courts that have adopted the Daniel R.R. test in whole or in part
have scrutinized the efforts made by the school to accommodate the
disabled child in the regular classroom. 383 However, in Daniel R.R.,
the court took the position that the Act does not require the school
to modify the regular education program beyond recognition; nor is
the school required to provide to provide special education in the
regular classroom.384 Rather, the school's inquiry should focus "on
the student's ability to grasp the essential elements of the regular
education curriculum." 3 86 In contrast, the Oberti court concluded
that "the fact that a child with disabilities will learn differently...
within a regular classroom does not justify exclusion from that environment." 386 Consequently, the court required the school to seriously consider modifying the regular education curriculum to accommodate the child's disability, provide for parallel instruction,
and train regular education instructors in special education
techniques. 87
While the Act clearly contemplates provision of "supplementary
aids and services" to assist the disabled child in receiving a satisfactory education in the regular classroom, modification of the regular
381. Compare Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048-49 (noting that the Act does not require the
school to modify the regular education program beyond recognition) with Oberti, 995 F.2d at
1217 (concluding that "the fact that a child with disabilities will learn differently ...
within a
regular classroom does not justify exclusion from that environment").
382. See, e.g., Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048-49 (discussing the instructor's role in the regular
classroom curriculum); DeVries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 879-80 (4th Cir. 1989)

(discussing "appropriate public education" in the "least restrictive environment").
383. See supra notes 225-85 and accompanying text (discussing the Daniel R.R. test).
384. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048.
385. Id.; see also DeVries, 882 F.2d at 879-80 (assessing the appropriateness of mainstreaming
a seventeen-year-old autistic youth by considering the youth's ability to master the academic subjects of his non-disabled peers).
386. Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1217 (3d Cir. 1993).
387. Id. at 1222.
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education program is not specifically mentioned. 888 However, the
Act's provision for an "individualized education program" ("IEP")
provides that a disabled child's education will involve goals, instructional objectives, and evaluation procedures that will vary from
those of the regular education program. 889 Moreover, the IEP provision is interpreted by the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitation Services to include consideration of modifications to the regular education program. 9 ' Thus, read consistently with the IEP
provision, the mainstreaming mandate assumes that inclusion will
involve modification of the regular education program to the extent
necessary to accommodate the child's IEP.
Other statutes concerned with the rights of disabled individuals
also speak to this issue. First, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") bars exclusion of "qualified individual[s] with a disability" from participation in the programs of public entities. 91 The ADA defines such a person as "an individual with
a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules,
policies, or practices, . . . or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for . . . participa' This provision clearly requires modifications to public protion." 392
grams to accommodate the disabilities of participating individuals.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973393 to require reasonable modifications to accommodate "otherwise qualified" individuals wishing
to participate in federally assisted activities.39 " Thus, interpreted in
pari materia with the ADA and Section 504,398 the mainstreaming
mandate's provision for "supplementary aids and services" should
388. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring "supplementary aids and
services").
389. Id. § 1401(a)(20).
390. 34 C.F.R. Part 300, App. C. (Question 48), cited as authority in Daniel R.R. v. State Bd.
of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989) and Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216.
391. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. IV 1992).
392. Id. § 12131(2) (emphasis added). "Public entity" includes "any State or local government
• . .special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State . . .or local government." Id.
§ 12131(1)(A), (B).
393. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). See notes 90-104 and accompanying text (discussing the civil
rights recognized under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
394. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 306-09 (1985).
395. See 2A SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST., supra note 346, § 46.05, at 103 ("[A] statutory subsection may not be considered in a vacuum, but must be considered in reference to the statute as a
) (emphawhole and in reference to statutes dealing with the same general subject matter .
sis added) (citations omitted)).
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include reasonable modification of the regular education curriculum
and instructional methodology.
Finally, there is simply no good reason for limiting accommodation of disabled children to the provision of supplementary aids and
services. "Reasonable modification" of the regular education curriculum and instructional methodology serves the same salutary purpose as "supplementary aids and services" -to facilitate the integration of children with disabilities. Thus, schools should be
expected to make reasonable modifications to the regular education
program where necessary to give disabled children meaningful access, unless of course the modification is shown to unduly burden
other disabled or non-disabled students. 96
4.

The Multifactor Approach

The mainstreaming provision of the IDEA uses broad language,
requiring schools to educate disabled children to the "maximum extent appropriate," and removing children from the regular classroom only when their "education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily."3 97 Hence, by necessity, courts have developed multifactor formulas to assist in analyzing the mainstreaming issue. 98 The principle two formulas are the Roncker feasibility test, 99 and the Daniel
R.R. two-step inquiry. 00° However, as one commentator has observed, "the differences in the formulas may be more verbal than
real." 4 o'
For instance, both formulas compare the educational benefits the
child is likely to derive from inclusion with the benefits of a more
restrictive placement. 2 Further, both formulas require school dis396. Cf. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (1993) (excusing program alterations mandated by the
ADA that "would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of... [the] program, . . . or
in undue financial and administrative burdens"); Alexander, 469 U.S. at 306-09 (holding that
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not require "fundamental" or "substantial"
modifications to accommodate the disabled).
397. 20 U.S.C. 1412(5)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
398. See supra notes 216-302 and accompanying text (discussing three tests, namely, the
Roncker feasibility test, the Daniel R.R. two-step inquiry, and the Rachel H. balancing test).
399. See supra notes 216-24 and accompanying text (discussing the Roncker feasibility test).
400. See supra notes 225-85 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing test developed in
Rachel H.). The court in Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th
Cir. 1994) adopted a four-factor test derived from both Roncker and Daniel R.R. See discussion
supra notes 286-302 and accompanying text.
401. WEBER, supra note 11, § 9.2 (Supp. 1994).
402. See supra notes 216-85 and accompanying text (discussing both the Roncker test and the
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tricts to seriously consider providing services to facilitate inclusion; 4 03 and to consider what, if any, disruptive effect will have on
the education of non-disabled students.40 4 Finally, cost was expressly
made a factor in Roncker4°5 and Rachel H.,40 as well as Greer,40 7 a
decision that adopted the Daniel R.R. formula.4 °8
Viewed in light of the language and purposes of the Act, these
factors are all relevant to the mainstreaming inquiry. However,
proper application of these factors requires clarification. The first
factor is the relative educational benefits to be derived from a mainstream placement as opposed to a more restrictive placement.4 09
Since education of the disabled is a stated purpose of the IDEA, a
comparison of the educational benefits to be derived from a mainstream placement, as opposed to a more restrictive placement, is
certainly a relevant consideration. 410 However, two points should be
kept in mind when making such a comparison. First, the definition
of "education" must be drawn from the IDEA. The IDEA defines
"special education" as "specially designed instruction . . .to meet
the unique needs of a child with a disability."'41I Each disabled
child's instruction is specially designed in the development of the
child's "individualized education program" ("IEP"). Thus, the comparison should not focus on the child's ability to derive educational
benefit from a general as opposed to a special education curriculum,
but rather on the capacity of each environment to promote progress
towards the child's IEP goals.41 2 Only if the disabled child is permitted to learn differently than non-disabled children will the IEP provision, as well as the mainstreaming provision, be served.
test developed in Daniel R.R.).
403. See supra notes 216-85 and accompanying text (discussing the Roncker test and the
Daniel R.R. test).
404. See supra notes 216-85 and accompanying text (discussing the tests in Roncker and
Daniel R.R.).
405. 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
406. 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994).
407. 950 F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 956 F.2d 1025 (1992).
408. Id. at 696.
409. See supra notes 216-302 and accompanying text (developing this factor in relation to tests
enunciated in Roncker, Daniel R.R., and Rachel H.).
410. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring that children be provided an "appropriate public education").
411. Id.§ 1401(a)(16).
412. See, e.g.,
Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1217 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that
"the fact that a child with disabilities will learn differently from his or her education within a
regular classroom does not justify exclusion from that environment").
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Secondly, as the Greer court aptly noted, the appropriate comparison is between an education in a restricted environment and an education in the regular classroom with supplementary aids and services.41 As has already been pointed out, this phrase should be
interpreted to include reasonable modification to the regular education program, a step that began with the development of the child's
individualized education program ("IEP").4 1 ' Thus, the comparison
should account for the whole range of services that are available to
assist the teacher and the child, as well as reasonable modifications
to the regular education program. 16
The second factor scrutinizes the efforts made to assist the child
in succeeding in the regular classroom. 1 6 The Daniel R.R. court
held that the obligation to provide services and modifications to accommodate the disabled child is broad, but not limitless."' However, "mere token gestures to accommodate [disabled] students" is
insufficient. 1 8
The limit on the school's obligation to provide support services
necessary to mainstream a disabled child is generally expressed as a
financial limit.4 1 9 Such a limit is consistent with the terms of the
IDEA. Disabled children are to be included to the "maximum extent appropriate, 4 20 and in the words of the Greer court, "[i]f the
cost of educating a [disabled] child in a regular classroom is so
great that it would significantly impact upon the education of other
children in the district, then education in a regular classroom is not
appropriate.14 2 Furthermore, the Act expressly limits the obligation
413. Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated on other
grounds, 956 F.2d 1025 (1lth Cir. 1992).
414. See supra notes 377-96 and accompanying text (discussing assistance used to achieve
inclusion).
415. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216.
416. See supra notes 225-85 and accompanying text (discussing the Daniel R.R. two-step
inquiry).
417. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989).
418. Id.
419. See, e.g., Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11 th Cir. 1991) (allowing the
school district to consider the cost of providing supplemental aids and services necessary to include
a disabled child), vacated on other grounds, 956 F.2d 1025 (11 th Cir. 1992); Roncker v. Walter,
700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir.) (concluding that the cost of mainstreaming is a relevant factor in

the analysis, provided that the school district is providing disabled children with a continuum of
alternative placements) (citing Age v. Bullitt County Public Sch., 673 F.2d 141, 145 (6th Cir.
1982)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
420. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
421. Greer, 950 F.2d at 697 (citing the provision of a full-time teacher for the child as an
example of a service the school district is not required to provide).

1995]

CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES

of local school districts to provide services in support of inclusion to
that which is "practicable. '4 2 Thus, the Act contemplates a financial limit on the school's obligation to accommodate the education of
disabled children in the regular classroom.
However, this does not mean that a school district may deny disabled children a mainstream placement because it is incrementally
more expensive than a segregated one. 423 Although it is not clear
that educating disabled children in the regular classroom with adequate support systems costs incrementally more over time than educating them in segregated environments, school districts, already operating under increasing financial constraints, are likely to focus on
the initial additional costs of inclusion. 4 Therefore, if a mere incremental increase in cost were a permissible basis for denying inclusion to disabled children, many disabled children could be legally
excluded; a result hardly contemplated by the mainstreaming mandate. Moreover, the Act requires that school districts provide services in support of inclusion, 425 and apply federal funding to the excess costs of educating disabled children.4 2 6 Thus, a merely
422. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(iv) (West 1990).
423. Greer, 950 F.2d at 697.
424. MATHEW D. COHEN. OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO INCLUSION OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES IN THE LOCAL SCHOOLS: A BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE 60 (1994) (a report prepared for the
Illinois Planning Council on Developmental Disabilities).
425. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)(l)(C)(iv) (West 1990).
426. Id. (requiring, inter alia, that local school agencies provide satisfactory assurance that
federal funding will be used for the excess costs of educating disabled children, including "to the
maximum extent practicable . . . the provision of special services to enable such children to participate in regular education programs"). For a variety of historical, administrative, and political
reasons, many states fund special education in a manner that puts school districts at risk of losing
funding for disabled children placed in the regular education classroom. See generally FINANCIAL
DISINCENTIVES. supra note 8, at 127-48 (discussing financial disincentives to inclusion in Illinois);
Howard P. Blackman, Special Education Placement: Is It What You Know or Where You Live?
55 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 459, 461 (1989) (discussing the role of state financing in the widely
varying rates of implementation among the states); Susan B. Hasazi et al., A Qualitative Policy
Study of the Least Restrictive Environment Provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 60 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 491, 496-97, 504 (1994) (discussing the role of financing in
the implementation of the mainstreaming mandate in six states and twelve local school districts);
James A. Tucker, Less Required Energy: A Response to Danielson and Bellamy, 55 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 456, 457-58 (1989) (discussing the role of state financing in the widely varying
rates of implementation among the states). Thus, the school district may not only be faced with
the incremental increase in the cost of educating a disabled child in the regular classroom, but
also with the possibility of losing substantial funding for that child altogether. See, e.g., Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the
school district's argument that it stood to lose $190,764 in state special education funding if the
child was not enrolled in a special education class for at least 51% of the day). Such financial
disincentives to mainstreaming should not be allowed to subvert implementation of the mainstreaming mandate. Hence, the prospect of lost funding for children that are mainstreamed should
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incremental increase in the cost of educating a disabled child in the
regular classroom is not a legitimate ground for placing that child in
a segregated classroom.
The third factor employed by the courts is the possible adverse
impact of the mainstream placement on the education of non-disabled children in the classroom.4 This factor is certainly relevant
to the mainstreaming issue since a mainstream placement that results in undue disruption of the education of other students can
hardly be said to be "appropriate." However, as the Oberti court
observed, this factor cannot be considered in isolation from the
school's obligation to provide supplementary aids and services to accommodate the child's need for additional attention.428 The IEP
should, in these instances, address the behavioral problems that are
presented.429 Therefore, when a child's disability results in behavior
so disruptive that it significantly impairs the education of other children, the child should be excluded from the regular classroom only
after reasonable efforts to address the problem has failed.
The Roncker and Daniel R.R. formulas neglect to consider two
other factors that merit discussion. First, in view of Congress's manifest objective to bring individuals with disabilities into the mainstream of society, 430 the court should consider the benefits of inclusion on the non-disabled children in the class.43 1 Non-disabled
children will hopefully come to understand and tolerate the differences presented by disabilities if they are given the opportunity to
interact with disabled children. At the very least, non-disabled children can learn, first-hand, that the disabled have certain rights.
Moreover, a disabled child brings a different perspective to the
classroom. The child may model a degree of determination in the
not be considered in the mainstreaming decision. Cf id. (finding the school district's argument on
the issue of cost unpersuasive since the district had not sought a waiver to the law cutting off
special education funding for students not enrolled in the special education classroom for at least
51% of the day).
427. See supra notes 216-302 and accompanying text (discussing the Roncker feasibility test,
the Daniel R.R. two-step inquiry, and the Rachel H. balancing test).
428. Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1217 (3d Cir. 1993).
429. Id.
430. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (Supp. IV 1992)
(stating that the full participation of disabled individuals is a national goal); Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that integration of
disabled children into the mainstream of society is a goal of the IDEA); accord Oberti v. Board of
Educ., 801 F. Supp. 1392, 1404 (D.N.J. 1992), affd, 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993).
431. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1217 n.24; see supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text (discussing

references in the legislative history to the benefits of mainstreaming for non-disabled students).
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face of adversity that will inspire classmates. A non-disabled child
who suffers a disabling illness or injury may be assisted by the experience of having had successfully functioning disabled peers. In sum,
the decision-makers should not forget the contribution that a disabled child will make to the regular education program.
Finally, courts should remember the important role that Congress
reserved for parents, guardians, and when appropriate, the children,
themselves, in the placement decision. 3 2 Parents and guardians, and
when appropriate, their children or wards with disabilities, are guaranteed a place at the table where the placement decision is made.4 "
Thus, what the parent/guardian or child thinks is an appropriate
placement should be a relevant factor to consider. The parent/
guardian has the benefit of living with or maintaining a close relationship with the child, and thereby acquiring an intimate familiarity with the child's needs. Furthermore, they are privy to personal
and confidential information that may have a significant bearing on
the placement decision - including information derived from independent evaluations and consultations with experts. Thus, the parent/guardian's view should be given due weight in the placement
decision.
This goes as well for the disabled child who is able to participate
in the development of the IEP. 4 Not only is respect for the views
of the child vital to the child's self-esteem and right of self-determination, but the very high drop-out rate among the disabled 43points to
the need to involve them early in the goal-setting process. 1
To summarize, the multifactor approach, especially as applied in
Greer, Oberti, and Rachel H., appropriately shifts the focus of the
placement decision away from the child's disability, something over
which the child has no control, to the capacity of the regular education program to accommodate the "differences" presented by children with disabilities. If the multifactor analysis includes considera432. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20) (Supp. V 1993) (providing for parents or guardians, and
when appropriate the disabled child herself, to participate in the development of the child's IEP);
see also Linda S. Abrahamson, Comment, The Probative Weight of the "Mainstreaming" Requirement Under the EHA, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 93, 128 (1991) (observing that an "appropriate" and "individualized" education for disabled children will require that the placement choice of
the parents or child be "given positive weight in a multi-factor analysis").
433. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20) (Supp. V 1993) (providing for parents or guardians, and
when appropriate the disabled child herself, to participate in the development of the child's IEP).
434. Id.
435. Almost one fourth of all students with disabilities dropped out of school in the 1990-91
school year. DOE 15TH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 29.
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tion of the benefits of inclusion for non-disabled children, as well as
the concerns of parents/guardians and the children themselves, it
can effectively assist all those involved in arriving at a placement
decision based on considerations contemplated by the Act.
5.

Conclusion

The decision whether to educate a child with disabilities in the
regular classroom involves consideration of a variety of factors.
Thus, only an individualized, fact-specific, and multifactor inquiry
can do justice to the daunting task of reviewing the appropriateness
of a disabled child's placement.43' Such an inquiry will no doubt
involve close questions of fact that will turn on the credibility of
parents, educators, and administrators. 3 7 However, the inquiry is
made easier by the fact that Congress clearly prefers placement in
the regular classroom." 8 Hence, courts reviewing the appropriateness of placement decisions should, in close cases, err on the side of
inclusion, not exclusion, from the regular education classroom.
The mainstreaming inquiry is only part of what ultimately determines the placement of a child. Such a potentially difficult decision
is bound to give rise to disputes between parents or guardians and
school authorities. Therefore, the process by which the placement
decision is ultimately arrived at is equally if not more important
than the substantive factors that should guide the inquiry. Thus, we
turn to the issue of what process the Act requires for the placement
decision.
C. The MainstreamingProcess
Influenced by such early "right to education" cases as Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth43 9 and Mills v.
Board of Education," 0 one of the principle purposes of the IDEA is
to insure that the rights of children with disabilities and their par436. See supra notes 331-39 and accompanying text (discussing individualized decision-making); see also supra notes 397-435 and accompanying text (discussing the multifactor approach to
the mainstreaming decision).
437. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 880-83 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (weighing the credibility of testimony by parents, teachers, and education experts), aff'd sub nom. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
438. See supra notes 358-76 and accompanying text (discussing the Congressional preference
for inclusion).
439. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified by 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
440. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
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ents are protected. " ' Hence, the IDEA takes the extraordinary step
of vesting parents and guardians with due process protections. As
the House Report explains, the elaborate procedural safeguards
found in the IDEA are designed, among other things, to assure that
every child with a disability is "in fact" afforded an education in the
"least restrictive environment."
The most elemental procedural
protection accorded parents and guardians is the opportunity to participate in the development of their child's IEP (individualized education program). 4 3 The IEP is a plan to address the unique educational needs of the child, and is to include a statement of the "extent
to which [the] child will be able to participate in regular educational programs." 4 Hence, the IEP assures a measure of parental
involvement as well as the documentation of an educational plan for
which the school is held accountable. Inevitably, however, the parents or guardians and the school district do not always agree on the
appropriate educational program and placement for the child.
Therefore, a mechanism for resolving disputes is necessary. The Act
gives parents and guardians standing to contest "any matter relating
to the [school's] identification, evaluation, or educational placement
of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education."' " 6 Thus, parents and guardians are entitled to make their case
at "an impartial due process hearing, '"" 6 the disposition of which
may ultimately be appealed to federal or state court." 7 The courts,
in turn, are bound to review the issues raised by the parties and
make "independent decision[s] based on a preponderance of the
' 8
evidence. "
Hence, on its face, the Act clearly vests parents and guardians of
441. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 194 n.18 (1982) (citing S. REP. No. 168, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1430; HR. REP. No. 332, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1975)).
442. H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975).
443. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20) (Supp. V 1993) (providing parents and guardians an opportunity to participate in the development of the child's IEP).
444. Id. § 1401(a)(20)(C).
445. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(b)(1)(E) (West 1990 & Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
446. Id. § 1415(b)(2).
447. See id. § 1415(e)(2) (providing alternative civil actions to aggrieved parties).
448. S. CONF. REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1480, 1503. The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to mean that the courts are to
review IDEA claims under a standard of review short of "de novo" but less deferential than
"substantial evidence." Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205 (1982). Specifically, the
courts are to accord "due weight" to the administrative proceedings, the records of which the
court is to receive. Id. at 206.
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disabled children with the right to challenge the substantive educational judgments - determinations of appropriate educational
goals, methodology, and placement - of local school districts. This
interpretation is not only warranted by the language of the Act, ""9
but the manifest lack of deference it shows to local government decision-making comports with what we know of Congress's constitutional concerns; concerns about exclusion, segregation, disparate
treatment, and other threats to the liberty and equal protection of
the disabled by local government. 450 However, in Board of Education v. Rowley, 51 the United States Supreme Court held that the
452
due process provisions of the IDEA do not mean what they say.
Discussing the standard of review in IDEA cases, the majority in
Rowley acknowledged that the scope of review mandated by the Act
extends beyond mere matters of state compliance with the Act's
procedural requirements.4 3 However, the Court went on to argue
that the emphasis Congress placed on procedural requirements,
which assure "parents and guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process, ' 454 contrasted with
the general and vague "substantive admonitions" in the Act, indicates that Congress intended courts to largely focus their review on
questions of procedural compliance.4 55 Hence, courts should defer to
the substantive judgments of local school authorities on matters of
educational methodology or policy. 456 Thus, in a remarkable display
of obfuscation, the majority averred that the IDEA's elaborate
scheme of procedural protections for parents or guardians, including
an opportunity to present complaints concerning "any matter relating to the . . . educational placement of the child '4 57 is only really
intended to guarantee "parental involvement. 458 The majority
sought to buttress its argument by stressing that "Congress' [sic]
449. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(b)(l)(E) (West 1990 & Supp. 1994) (giving parents and guardians standing to contest .'any matter relating to the [school's] identification, evaluation or educa-

tional placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education") (emphasis
added).
450. See supra notes 109-30 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional concerns
running through the legislative history of the IDEA).
451. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
452. Id. at 205-06.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 204 (emphasis added) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E) (1976)).
458. Id. at 208.
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intention was not that the Act displace the primacy of States in the
field of education, but that States receive funds to assist them."" 9
However, it is difficult to square this statement with that of the Senate Report: "Congress must take a more active role under its responsibility for equal protection of the laws to guarantee that [disabled] children are provided equal educational opportunity. ' 46 0
State indifference to the Fourteenth Amendment, not mere state impecuniosity, animated Congress's passage of the IDEA. 61
Judicial review of placement decisions remains a linchpin in the
IDEA's comprehensive scheme of protecting the rights of children
with disabilities and bringing them into the mainstream of their
communities. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's cramped interpretation of the IDEA's judicial review provisions, numerous lower
courts have freely reviewed the placement decisions of school districts for compliance with the mainstreaming mandate. 62 Such review not only ensures that "parental involvement" will be meaningful, but it acts as a necessary check on the discriminatory policies
that have historically plagued the education of disabled children." 3
Congress only recently reiterated that discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in education,464 and a United States
Department of Education report to Congress found that nearly twothirds of the state special education plans submitted for approval in
1991 were not in compliance with the mainstreaming requirements
of the IDEA."6
Additionally, uniformity in the implementation of the mainstreaming mandate at the state and local level is woefully lacking.4 66
459. Id.
460. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1433.

461. See supra notes 109-30 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the
IDEA); see also DOE 15TH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 119 (reporting that nearly twothirds of the state plans submitted to the DOE for approval in 1991 were not in compliance with
the mainstreaming requirements of the IDEA).
462. See supra notes 216-332 and accompanying text (discussing federal appellate opinions
reviewing the mainstreaming issue).
463. See supra notes 107-24 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional concerns
raised in the legislative history).
464. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1992).
465. DOE 15TH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 119.
466. See id. at A-62 (observing the disparity between the states with rates for mainstreaming
mentally retarded children, defined as children spending at least 40% of the school day in the
regular education classroom); see also SUBCOMMITTEE TO THE PUBLIC POLICY COMMITTEE, ILLINOIS PLANNING COUNCIL ON DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, FINAL REPORT: KEEPING KIDS IN

THEIR HOME SCHOOLS 17, Tables 2-4 (Sept. 1990) (disclosing a wide disparity among Illinois
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It is doubtful that Congress intended for inclusion in the regular
classroom to depend on the vicissitudes of residency."6" Judicial review, therefore, affords an opportunity to bring more rationality to
the placement process by giving parents, educators, and state and
local administrators and hearing officers the concrete guidance they
need on implementation of the mainstreaming mandate. However,
the courts will only make matters worse unless they arrive at a degree of consensus on the mainstreaming issue. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court's analysis in Rowley generated a judicial approach
to the mainstreaming provision that continues to foster confusion
and uncertainty.
D. Educational Methodology and the Mainstreaming Issue
The Supreme Court's analysis of the IDEA in Rowley yielded a
two-part formula for judicial review of cases brought under the
IDEA: (1) did the school district comply with the procedures of the
Act, and (2) is the individualized education program "reasonably
calculated" to confer educational benefits on the child.4 68 Commenting on this formula, then Justice Rehnquist stated: "[O]nce a court
determines that the requirements of the Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States.""69 This comment is the source of a fundamental conflict among the federal
courts of appeals. A number of courts have concluded that the
placement decision is one of methodology, and therefore beyond the
scope of judicial review.470 Other courts, however, do not read the
Supreme Court's concern for local autonomy in matters of educational methodology as an excuse for not enforcing the mainstreaming mandate.471
school districts in the percentage of disabled children educated in the regular education classroom); Louis C. Danielson & G. Thomas Bellamy, State Variation in Placement of Children with
Handicaps in Segregated Environments, 55 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 448, 451-54 (1989) (illustrating that children with similar disabilities are mainstreamed at widely diverging rates depending on where they reside); accord Alan Gartner & Dorothy K. Lipsky, Beyond Special Education:
Toward a Quality System for All Students, 57 HARv. EDuc. REV. 367, 374-75 (1987).

467. For a policy study comparing states and local school districts having high rates of segregation with those with low rates, see Hasazi, supra note 426, at 495-506.
468. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982). But see Greer v. Rome City Sch.
Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 695-96 (1Ilth Cir. 1991) (interpreting the test in Rowley as not extending to
mainstreaming issues), vacated on other grounds, 956 F.2d 1025 (1 lth Cir. 1992).
469. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208.
470. See supra notes 303-32 and accompanying text (explaining the deferential approach employed by some of the federal circuits).
471. See supra notes 216-302 and accompanying text (discussing the Roncker feasibility test,
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The educational placement of a child with disabilities is arguably
by definition a matter of educational methodology, requiring as it
does an expert assessment of the best environment for meeting the
child's unique educational needs.472 Whenever the IEP team considers how to best educate a child with disabilities, it must also consider where best to educate the child, be it a regular education classroom, special education classroom, special education day school,
residential facility, hospital, or the child's home. Consequently, the
court's decision to cast the issue in Lachman v. Illinois State Board
of Education473 as a "how" (cued speech or total communication)
rather than a "where" (integrated or segregated classroom) misses
the point. 74 For, at bottom, the "how" and the "where" of educating a child with disabilities are two sides of the same coin that is the
subject of the individualized, fact-specific inquiry mandated by the
Act. 47' Both the "how" and the "where" are potentially questions of
methodology, and the mistake the Lachman and other federal appellate courts have made applying the Rowley formula to the mainstreaming issue, is to think that once they determine "methodology"
is at issue in the case, Rowley requires deference to the placement
decisions of local school officials.47 6
This conclusion is flawed for several reasons. First, the mainstreaming mandate was not at issue in Rowley. 7 In fact, the court
explicitly confined its analysis to the facts of Amy Rowley's case: a
hearing-impaired child who was receiving "substantial specialized
instruction and related services, and . . . performing above average
in the regular classrooms of a public school system. 478 Consequently, the court's counsel that educational methodology and policy
the Daniel R.R. two-step inquiry, and the Rachel H. balancing approach).
472. See, e.g., Briggs v. Board of Educ., 882 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1989) (analyzing the
placement decision as one of methodology).
473. 852 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1988).
474. See id. at 296 (concluding that "[o]n the facts of this case," the mainstreaming issue "is
subsumed by the parties' disagreement as to methodology").
475. See supra notes 348-57 and accompanying text (explaining the importance of an individualized decision).
476. See supra notes 303-32 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have applied the
Rowley formula in some fashion to the mainstreaming issue).
477. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982) (confining its analysis to the
situation where a child is performing above average in the regular classroom); Greer v. Rome City
Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 695-96, 696 n.25 (1 th Cir. 1991) (agreeing with those federal circuit
courts that have concluded that the two-part Rowley test was not intended to decide mainstreaming issues), vacated on other grounds, 956 F.2d 1025 (11th Cir. 1992).
478. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202.
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is beyond the scope of judicial review is properly confined to those
cases where the child is already being educated in the regular classroom, using the regular education curriculum. Secondly, the dispute
over educational methodology in Rowley did not bear on the child's
access to the regular education classroom. The question whether
Amy was entitled to a sign-language interpreter had no bearing on
whether Amy would be educated alongside her non-disabled peers.
In other words, not only was the mainstreaming mandate not at issue in Rowley, the mainstreaming mandate was not even implicated
by the dispute over methodology.479
The final and most decisive reason the Rowley test should not be
applied to mainstreaming cases is that it effectively renders the
mainstreaming mandate a dead letter.4 80 Educational placement is
so intertwined with questions of methodology that school districts
can simply cast the educational placement issue as one of methodology, thereby evading the mainstreaming obligation altogether. For
example, in Briggs v. Board of Education,481 the mainstreaming
mandate was satisfied when a school district moved a child to a
more restrictive setting "reasonably calculated" to provide a "free,
appropriate education."4 82 Provided the school could articulate educational reasons for the placement, the decision was deemed one of
methodology left to the discretion of local school authorities. 83 Similarly, in Mark A. v. Grant Wood Area Education Agency, "84 the
court analyzed the dispute over where the child would be placed as
a dispute over how the child would be educated.4 85 Finding that the
child was receiving an "appropriate" education, the court viewed the
question of where the child would be educated as one of methodology for resolution by the school.486
Other courts, in contrast, have recognized that concerns for local
autonomy in matters of educational policy cannot justify ignoring
Congress's mandate to bring children with disabilities into the regu479. See Greer, 950 F.2d at 695 (observing that "the Rowley test assumes that the Act's mainstreaming requirement has been met").
480. It is an " 'elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not
to render one part inoperative.'" Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472
U.S. 237, 249 (1985) (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979)).
481. 882 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989).
482. Id. at 693.
483. Id. (citing Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207-08 (1982)).
484. 795 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 936 (1987).
485. Id. at 54.
486. Id. (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208).
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lar education classroom. For example, in Greer v. Rome City School
District,8 7 a panel of the federal Eleventh Circuit held that the
school's determination that a segregated educational setting would
confer a greater educational benefit on the child was due no deference because the school had not considered the "full range of supplemental aids and services . . . that could be provided to assist [the
child] in the regular classroom. 48 8 Interestingly, the court construed Rowley only to require deference to local school districts in
matters of educational methodology after the requirements of the
Act, including the mainstreaming requirement, have been met. "89
Thus, the court was not deterred from analyzing the placement decision as a mainstreaming issue, despite the school's conclusion that
a segregated placement would be educationally superior. 90
Likewise, the court in Oberti v. Board of Education4 91 concluded
that the United States Supreme Court's admonition not to interfere
with the educational methodology decisions of local school districts
was not inconsistent with the court's duty to enforce the Act's mainstreaming provision. 92 At the trial on the merits, the school district
contended that educational techniques and methodologies necessary
to appropriately educate a child with severe intellectual disabilities
could not be feasibly introduced in the regular education classroom.493 However, as the federal appellate court observed, the
Oberti's experts cogently refuted this claim, describing a variety of
methods and techniques that a regular education teacher with appropriate training could successfully import into the regular education classroom without undue disruption. 9 ' Thus, Oberti graphically
illustrates the inevitable interaction between questions of method
and educational placement, which if left to the sole discretion of
local school districts, would render the mainstreaming mandate a
dead letter. The school board in Oberti asserted an educational policy that it is not appropriate to educate children with severe intellectual disabilities in the regular classroom.' 95 Had the Oberti court,
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.

950 F.2d 688 (11 th Cir. 1991).
Id.at 698.
Id. at 699.
Id. at 698.
995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993) (Oberti II).
Id.at 1214.
Oberti v. Board of Educ., 801 F. Supp. 1392, 1403 (D.N.J. 1992) (Oberti 1).
Oberti I1 995 F.2d at 1222.
Oberti 1,801 F. Supp. at 1403.
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out of deference to local autonomy in matters of educational policy
and methodology, declined to consider the methodological issues debated by the parties, the mainstreaming mandate would have held
no meaning for children with severe intellectual disabilities.
Methodology was also at the heart of Rachel H.4 91 However, the
court found nothing improper about the war between the experts
that waged in the lower court on the issue of Rachel's educational
progress under different educational regimes.497 The trial court
found that Rachel's experts were more credible on the issue of
whether education in the regular classroom would be educationally
superior to an education in a more restricted setting.498 Noting that
the lower court held a full evidentiary hearing on the issue, the appellate court would not disturb the lower court's decision that
Rachel was entitled to placement in the regular education
classroom.499
The individualized, multi-factored, and fact-specific mainstreaming analysis employed in Greer, Oberti, and Rachel H. compels
school districts to adduce evidence and reasons, not merely conclusions or policy statements, to support restrictive placements. Consequently, this approach effectively unmasks the false or unverified
methodological assumptions, and legally insufficient provision of
"supplemental aids and services," that have historically barred so
many disabled children from the regular classroom. The mainstreaming mandate would clearly be frustrated if school districts are
spared scrutiny of their placement decisions on the grounds that
such scrutiny is an improper intrusion into matters of policy and
methodology. Accordingly, courts should properly limit the application of the Rowley test to its facts, and heed its discourse on educational methodology with great circumspection. In the words of one
court: "[W]e do not read the Supreme Court's salutary warnings
against interference with educational methodology as an invitation
to abdicate our obligation to enforce the statutory provisions [of the
Act] .500
496. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1401 (9th Cir. 1994),
affig Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
497. Id. at 1404.
498. Holland, 786 F. Supp. at 881-82.
499. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1404.
500. Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 184 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989).
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DESEGREGATION OF CHILDREN WITH
DISABILITIES

The IDEA does not mandate formal equality between disabled
and non-disabled children, recognizing that the unique educational
needs of disabled children may at times warrant disparate treatment. "0 1 Accordingly, the Act contemplates more restrictive settings
where necessary to satisfactorily meet the unique educational needs
of the disabled.502 However, the IDEA also contemplates that,
through developments in diagnostic and instructional procedures,503
training of regular, as well as special education teachers, 504 the provision of "supplementary aids and services" by local school districts, 50 5 and the infusion of federal funds, 0 6 most disabled children
previously excluded can now be successfully educated in the regular
education classroom. 0 7 Notwithstanding Congress's clear preference
for including disabled children in the regular classroom, only about
one-third of the approximately five million children who received
special education in the 1990-91 school year were educated in the
regular classroom. 05 Studies suggest this is largely due to systemic
barriers, such as state funding disincentives, dual systems of general
education and special education, separate higher education and cer501. See supra notes 341-47 and accompanying text (discussing the mainstreaming mandate
and problems of determining when inclusion is appropriate); cf.Mark C. Weber, ADA Recognizes
Formal Equality is Not Equal Enough, HUM. RTs., Spring 1992, at 2 (finding that disabilities
can create differences that are relevant to some programs and activities, and thus require different
treatment to achieve functional equality). For a newspaper article that raises issues of formal and
functional equality in competitive sports for the disabled, see Janita Poe, Whole New Game, CM.
TRIa., May 2, 1994, § 2, at 1.
502. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring mainstreaming to the "maximum
extent appropriate" and exclusion from the regular education classroom only when the child cannot be satisfactorily educated there "with the use of supplementary aids and services"); 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.552(d) (1993) ("In selecting the LRE [least restrictive environment], consideration is given
to any potential harmful effect on the child or on the quality of services that he or she needs.").
503. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(7) (Supp. V 1993).
504. Id. § 1413(a)(3)(A); see also S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1975) (identifying inservice training of regular education teachers and support personnel as a necessary prerequisite to achieving "integration of [disabled] children into the classroom"), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1457.
505. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (Supp. V. 1993); 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)(C)(iv) (West 1990 &
Supp. 1994).
506. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(9) (Supp. V 1993).
507. See id. § 1412(5)(B) (providing for integration of disabled children with non-disabled
children); see also Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982) (recognizing that the Act
"requires participating States to educate [disabled] children with [non-disabled] children whenever possible").
508. DOE 15TH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 16.
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tification of general and special education teachers, vested interests
in disability categories, and a history of delivering special education
services through regional centers.509 Such systemic impediments to
inclusion of disabled children are not a legitimate ground for denying a disabled child access to the regular classroom. 510 They effectively deprive the child of an individualized education, compromising the integrity of the placement decision through the tacit
introduction of improper considerations. 5 "
The presence of systemic barriers to inclusion underscores the importance of the judiciary in enforcing the mainstreaming mandate
of the Act. The judiciary's obligation to independently review the
issues raised, 1 ' and grant relief it deems appropriate means, among
other things, that courts have the crucial responsibility to scrutinize
school district "findings" and "conclusions" having the effect of excluding disabled children from the regular classroom. Only then will
the procedural safeguards accorded disabled children operate to ensure that segregated placements are based on proper considerations
and fact-finding, and not "disagreement with the mainstreaming
concept."51
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite state legislative reforms that found nearly every state in
the Union with some form of mandatory education of disabled children,51 4 in 1975, the House Committee on Education and Labor
found that over fifty percent of the disabled children in the nation
were denied a fundamental educational opportunity.51 5 Such a con509. See generally Hasazi, supra note 426, at 498-504 (detailing structural causes behind the
widely varying rates of inclusion at the state and local level).
510. See, e.g., Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir.
1994) (noting that a state law requirement that disabled children be educated by a special education teacher would be inconsistent with the mainstreaming mandate).
511. See supra notes 397-435 and accompanying text (discussing the factors that are appropriate to consider in the placement decision).
512. See S. CONF. REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1975) (giving that courts are bound
to make independent decisions after reviewing the issues raised by parents or guardians), reprinted
in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1480, 1503.
513. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir.), cert. denied. 464 U.S. 864 (1983); see
H.R. REP. No.332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975) (noting that the elaborate procedural safeguards accorded disabled children by the IDEA are intended to assure that disabled children are
"in fact" educated in the "least restrictive environment").
514. See H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975) (discussing the first state laws
mandating programs for disabled children).
515. Id. at 7.
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stitutionally suspect disparity in the educational opportunities provided to non-disabled and disabled children prompted Congress to
pass what is now titled the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act ("IDEA" or "the Act"). 16 To assure equal protection of the
law for children with disabilities, Congress fashioned a grant-in-aid
statute that would financially assist state and local governments in
517
providing appropriate educational opportunities for the disabled.
However, Congress did not merely throw money at the problem of
bringing states into compliance with the Constitution. As a condition for receipt of funding, Congress mandated the adoption of principles for educating disabled children, principles first enunciated in
the early right to special education cases.51 8 Specifically, the Act
requires that children with disabilities be provided (1) a "free appropriate public education . . . designed to meet their unique
needs;" 519 (2) an education in the least restrictive environment; 2 0
and (3) procedural safeguards including the right to notice and a
hearing. 21
Congress recently reaffirmed its commitment to eradicate discrimination in education on the basis of disabilities with passage of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). 22 The ADA
bars state and local public entities from denying disabled individuals
516. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 775 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
517. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(9) (Supp. V 1993) (providing for federal assistance to aid the
states in providing educational programs).
518. See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972) (requiring every child
be entitled to receive a publicly supported education from which they can benefit), discussed in
Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor, HR. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1975); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth ("P.A.R.C."), 334 F.
Supp. 1257, 1260 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (ensuring disabled have access to free public education and
training), later proceeding, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
519. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. V 1993). Compare id. (mandating a free appropriate public
education designed to meet the unique needs of the child) with Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 876 (holding that the additional cost of educating children with disabilities could not serve to exclude them
from a public education) and P.A.R.C., 343 F. Supp. at 314 (mandating "access to a free public
program of education and training appropriate to [the] capacities" of each child).
520. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (Supp. V 1993). Compare id. (mandating education of disabled
children in the least restrictive environment) with P.A.R.C., 343 F. Supp. at 307 (obligating
schools to prefer placement in the regular education classroom over more restrictive placements).
521. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (Supp. V 1993). Compare id. (vesting parents and guardians of
disabled children with due process guarantees) with Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875 (holding that
denial of special education services without a hearing violated the child's constitutional rights) and
P.A.R.C., 343 F. Supp. at 303-04 (entitling parents to a notice and hearing before any change in
the child's educational placement).
522. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1992).

670

DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W

[Vol. 44:599

participation in programs and activities that, with reasonable modifications or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, such individuals would otherwise qualify for.52 Both the IDEA and the ADA
make clear Congress's intent to bring children and adults with disabilities into the mainstream of their communities. 2 4
The mainstreaming mandate of the IDEA is clearly the favored
legal mechanism by which disabled children are to be integrated
into their communities. However, there is uncertainty over what is
(a) the substantive standard for inclusion, and (b) the proper scope
of judicial review of placement decisions. Such uncertainty can only
contribute to the statistically significant lack of inclusion for disabled children, especially children with intellectual disabilities.5 25
This uncertainty stems in part from federal appellate court decisions
that diverge on two critical points.
First, courts are divided on the issue of whether the mainstreaming mandate requires schools to make reasonable modifications to
the regular education curriculum and instructional methodology to
accommodate the inclusion of children with disabilities. 2 Second,
courts are in disagreement on whether the educational placement
decision is one of "methodology," and thus, under Board of Education v. Rowley, 52 7 a decision within the sole discretion of local school
authorities.
Analyzing these and related issues, this Comment advances an
interpretation of the IDEA that recommends a mainstreaming inquiry and process.5 29 Educational placement decisions for disabled
children hould be individualized and based on a searching factual
inquiry guided by relevant factors. Moreover, the decision should be
made in light of Congress's manifest preference for including disabled children in the regular classroom, and involve serious consid523. Id. § 12131(2).
524. See supra notes 369-74 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's objectives in outlawing discriminatory barriers for disabled children and adults).
525. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (relating the statistics of those disabled children actually included in the regular classroom).
526. See supra notes 377-96 and accompanying text (discussing whether the requirement to
facilitate inclusion through the provision of "supplementary aids and services" includes a require-

ment to make reasonable modifications to the regular educational program).
527. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).

528. See supra notes 439-500 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of judicial review of
substantive placement decisions and the United States Supreme Court's admonitions that questions of educational "methodology" are reserved for local school authorities).
529. See supra notes 348-467 and accompanying text (delineating a mainstreaming inquiry

process).
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eration of what reasonable modifications to the regular education
program can be made to facilitate a child's inclusion. 530
The mainstreaming decision also involves a process that begins
with parental, and, where appropriate, student participation in the
development of an "individualized education program." If necessary, the process culminates in an independent judicial review of the
placement decision. Although questions of educational methodology
are invariably incident to a disabled child's placement decision, judicial review of such decisions is not an inappropriate intrusion into
the domain of local governance. Rather, an independent review is
necessary to preserve any meaningful place for mainstreaming in
5 31
the Act's scheme of educational reform.
Moreover, evidence of the systemic segregation of children with
disabilities nineteen years after the passage of the IDEA suggests
that an independent judicial review of mainstreaming decisions is
vital to realizing Congress's manifest goals of assuring "equality of
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic
self-sufficiency" for individuals with disabilities. 5 2 Hence, courts
should not hesitate to scrutinize placement decisions for disabled
children, ever mindful that "[i]nclusion is a right, not a privilege for
a select few." 533
Daniel H. Melvin II

530. See supra notes 348-438 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant factors in the

mainstreaming inquiry).
531. See supra notes 439-500 and accompanying text (concluding that an independent and
broad judicial review of placement decisions for disabled children is warranted by the language of
the Act and necessary to realize its objectives).
532. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (Supp. IV 1992).
533. Oberti v. Board of Educ., 801 F. Supp. 1392, 1404 (D.N.J. 1992), affd, 995 F.2d 1204
(3d Cir. 1993).

